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Preface
 
In this dissertation I will examine the relationship between religion and state and how the 
historical evolution of this relationship has affected current economic outcomes. Developing an 
argument centered on legitimizing relationship between ruler and religion, I investigate these 
topics empirically with a new dataset that has information on the religious and political histories 
of today's nations since the year 1000.  In the first chapter, I demonstrate how state religion 
evolves over time and across space since the year 1000, and then in the second chapter analyze 
how historical religious difference between rulers and segments of populations affect current 
civil conflict, and finally in the third chapter extend the analysis to the historical roots of current 
state capacity and economic development.  
The first chapter will examine the evolution of state religion over time and its variation 
across geographic regions and religious traditions. Using the variations over time and across 
countries in regression analysis it investigates the forces affecting the adoption of state religion 
during the period between the year 1000 and the year 2000. It also utilizes an instrumental 
variable approach to deal with the enodogeneity problem by using variation in the missionary 
characteristics of religions as an exogenous source of variation that predicts the  continuing 
presence of official monopolies in the religion market. 
In the second chapter, I focus on the relationship between the religion of political rulers 
and that of different segments of population and examine how historical religious differences 
between political rulers and segments of population contribute to levels of current civil conflict. I 
2  
develop a political economy model in which the ruler’s choices of public goods and services 
(e.g. infrastructure and law enforcement) and the access to them in a religiously segmented 
economy are linked to the civil conflict through grievances. To test the model’s implications, I 
use recent data on armed civil conflict and incorporate variables constructed from the new 
dataset that includes information on the religious and political histories of today's nations since 
the year 1000. 
Extending the political economy approach to economic development outcomes, in the 
third chapter, I develop formal hypotheses regarding the way historical religious differences 
between rulers and population affect current state capacity and economic development across 
countries. I then test the hypotheses empirically with the dataset on the religious and political 
histories of today's nations and recent data on measures of state capacity and economic 
development.
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1. CHAPTER 1: STATE AND RELIGION OVER TIME 
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1.1 Introduction 
Throughout history, the religion market has been regulated heavily by political rulers, 
who often designated an established provider as the official monopoly. Although the 
frequency of state monopolies has declined significantly in recent centuries, the tendency 
remains strong in some societies. The presence of a state religion has been at the core of 
numerous socio-economic concerns, such as the rights of religious minorities, restrictions on 
personal consumption and investment, and emergence of political and violent conflicts. 
Scholars have long puzzled over the relationship between state and religion. Adam 
Smith laid the foundation for an economic approach to religion and discussed how the 
incentives of the clergy and the religiosity of the people differed between state religion and a 
competitive religion market (Anderson, 1988). Expanding on Smith’s insights, Iannaccone, 
Finke, and Stark (1997:350)have argued that many of the recent religious trends can be 
explained by simple deregulation of religion markets, and that cross-country differences in 
religiosity depend on the competitiveness of the market and the presence of state religion. 
Their argument contrasts with the results of McCleary and Barro (2006), who found that the 
presence of state religion tends to raise participation and beliefs. A considerable literature has 
recently grown to investigate the effects of state regulation of religion (Chen and Hungerman, 
2014; Fox, 2008: Chapter 2; Gill, 2008). 
In a related development, researchers have examined the more fundamental question 
of why some countries regulate religion in the first place. Gill (2008) has proposed a theory 
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that depends on the political self-interest of government officials, and he has used the 
resulting predictions to explain state-religion relationships in the early United States and in 
Latin America during the 1800s. The relationship between state and religion has recently 
attracted rising interest among empirically-oriented social scientists. Barro and McCleary 
(2005) have identified countries with a state religion in 1900, 1970, and 2000, and used 
cross-national data to investigate the factors contributing to the likelihood of state religion in 
1970 and 2000. Building a “Religion and State” dataset, Fox (2008) has examined how 
government involvement in religion has differed among countries and changed during the 
period between 1990 and 2008. 
Coşgel and Miceli (2009) have similarly used cross-national data to study forces 
affecting a government’s decision to establish a state religion or to support, control, or 
suppress religion at the beginning of the twenty-first century. 
In this article we offer a systematic analysis of the religion market in history with 
particular emphasis on its relationship to the state. Although previous researchers have 
identified significant patterns in state regulation of religion in today’s societies and in recent 
history, they have given limited insight into the deeper historical roots of these patterns and 
the long term trends that led to them. We contribute to this literature by using a political 
economy approach to the relationship between state and religion and examining the evolution 
of state religion since the year 1,000. We have developed a unique cross-national panel dataset 
on the political and religious histories of today’s nation states during this period. We use the 
data to pursue three objectives. First, we examine the evolution of state religion over time and 
its variation across geographic regions and religious traditions. Second, we use regression 
analysis to examine the influences on the adoption of state religion, such as regional 
6  
geographic factors and systematic differences between universal/missionary religions 
(Buddhism, Christianity, Islam) and others.
1
 
1.2 Description of the Data 
For a systematic analysis of the relationship between state and religion over time, we 
have developed a unique dataset that includes long-term information on the political and 
religious histories of today’s countries. We constructed the data in stages that involve 
blending two different datasets. The first is the “Country Ancestry Data” (CAD), which 
identifies the polities that have ruled today’s countries in history. Taking today’s nation-
states as the unit of analysis, we recorded the name(s) of the polity that dominated each 
country’s land area in 50- 100 year intervals since the year 1000. If in a certain interval this 
land area was dominated by two polities, we recorded this information as well. 
Separately, we built the “Historical Polities Data” (HPD), which includes all of the 
polities encountered in CAD and contains information on the religious and political 
characteristics of these polities dating back to about 3,700 BCE. If these characteristics 
changed significantly during a polity’s lifetime, such as if the rulers or the majority of the 
population converted to another religion, we incorporated the change by including the pre-
change and post- change regimes as separate entries in the dataset. In the same vein, if the sub-
regions of a polity varied significantly in religious composition or in the relationship between 
religious and political authorities, we incorporated these differences by including each regions 
as a separate entry. This was clearly the case for European colonies, where the majority 
religion differed significantly between the indigenous population and the colonizing country, 
                                                     
1
 For a recent study that goes even further back in time, see Vaubel (2015). 
 
2
 By keeping the definition of “dependent” broad, we seek to avoid difficulties surrounding the classification of 
states and territories into controversial categories. For a discussion of these difficulties and controversies, see 
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as did the relationship between religious and political authorities. To consider these variations, 
we included the colonizing country and the territories as separate entries. 
To construct the HPD, a team of research assistants combed through a wide variety of 
sources to gather information about the basic characteristics of these polities, their religion 
markets, and the relationship between political and religious authorities. We started with 
polities that have been included in readily available datasets constructed by other researchers, 
and we resorted to other sources as necessary to expand on the list of polities and to code 
variables that were not available in these sources (Iyigün, 2010; Turchin et al, 2012). For the 
year 2000, we used variables from the datasets of Barro and McCleary (2005) and Fox (2008). 
In cases of conflicting information about a particular variable, we looked for consistency by 
giving priority to sources with comprehensive coverage, such as Encyclopædia Britannica, 
World Christian Encyclopedia, The Oxford International Encyclopedia of Legal History, and 
the book series “Cambridge Histories Online.” Rather than restrict the dataset to polities of 
certain size, duration, or type, we included all polities for which we could find complete 
information. The final set includes information on over 500 polities observed in history and 
most of today’s nation states. 
For each polity, the HPD includes variables on its basic characteristics, the 
organization and regulation of the religion market, and the relationship between political and 
religious authorities. The basic characteristics of a polity include variables on its size (e.g., 
peak land mass), geographic location, political type, and years of duration. In addition, we 
included a set of variables on the process of a polity’s formation and the cause of its demise. 
For information on the religion market of a polity, we entered the names of the 
majority and minority religion(s) of the population, the religion of the rulers if it was 
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different from the majority religion, and whether there was a religious conversion. We also 
included a dummy variable on whether the political authorities chose one (or more) of the 
religions as the official provider (state religion). 
The last group of variables describes the characteristics of religious and political 
providers and the nature of their relationship with each other. To depict the rulers’ direct 
relationship with religious authorities, we included variables on whether the religious 
authorities were appointed by the political authority, whether they received direct payment 
from political authorities, and whether religious property and buildings were owned or 
supported by political authorities. 
In the final stage of our data construction, we combined HPD and CAD to arrive at a 
dataset that includes information on the political and religious evolution of the lands 
corresponding to today’s countries since the year 1000. Between 1000 and 1500, the 
information is in 100 year intervals, and for the period since 1500, in 50 year intervals. 
Although the CAD originally covered 249 countries, we dropped some of them from the final 
analysis because of their size (e.g., small islands, to prevent overrepresentation) or the 
unavailability of complete and reliable information about their history. The final set includes 
204 countries covered in each interval in an unbalanced cross-national panel dataset that 
includes information on the current and historical polities dominating these lands during our 
period, thereby allowing us to identify the long-term trends in the religiosity of states and the 
relationship between political and religious authorities.
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Table 1.1 Majority Religions in 1000 and 2000 
 
 
Africa 
 
Asia 
  
Europe 
 
Oceania 
Western 
Hemisphere 
Majority Religion 1000 2000 1000 2000 1000 2000 1000 2000 1000 2000 
 
Traditional African 
 
38 
 
7 
        
Buddhist   7 13       
Other Eastern  1 15 4       
Christian 2 22 5 6 36 40  11  45 
Muslim 7 20 19 25  2     
Other Religion 3  5 3 8 2 11  49 4 
 
Table 1.1 shows the distribution of entries in our dataset by continent and majority 
religion in years 1000 and 2000, the beginning and end dates of our investigation. As seen in 
the table, there was a fundamental shift in the majority religions of these lands from 
indigenous religions (e.g., traditional African or Eastern) towards Islam, Christianity, and 
Buddhism, which are generally referred as missionary/universal religions. The transition 
towards Abrahamic faiths is particularly striking in the spread of Islam in Asia, Christianity in 
Oceania and the Western Hemisphere, and both Islam and Christianity in Africa during this 
period. Although we did not include the regional breakdown of these trends in the table, our 
data reflects the spread of Islam mainly in North Africa and Christianity in sub-Saharan 
Africa. The majority of eastern religions remained about the same in Asia, but there was a 
sharp decline in Oceania. 
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1.2 State Religion since the Year 1,000 
We now use the data to investigate our first question, namely, how the presence of 
state religion changed over time. As noted, Barro and McCleary(2005) have found that the 
fraction of states with monopoly religion fell sharply between 1900 and 1970 and stayed 
about the same between 1970 and 2000. For the presence of state religion in 2000, we used 
information from Fox’s (2008) “Official Government Involvement in Religion” variable” (=1 
if the state has a “civil religion”, “one official religion,” or “more than one official religion”) 
and applied the same basis for coding the presence of state religion in history to extend the 
analysis back to the year 1000. 
We do not have complete data on the presence of state religion for the early histories of 
some societies. This is obviously the case for societies that left behind no written records or 
clear archeological evidence on the relationship between political and religious authorities. In 
addition, the concept of state religion is not well-defined for societies that occupied the lands 
corresponding to today’s nation-states in history but were not at that time territorial political 
entities or governed by centralized power and institutions. For example, we know too little 
about the organization of many African societies prior to colonization to determine with a high 
degree of certainty whether they can be classified as having a state religion. The same can be 
said for many societies in Oceania and Western Hemisphere before the fifteenth century. 
Rather than base our coding on questionable assumptions about the organization of these 
societies or make ad hoc assumptions about the relationship between their political and 
religious authorities, we have decided to omit them from analysis. 
As Table 1.2 shows, the falling incidence of state-religion that Barro and McCleary 
observed in the early part of the twentieth century was part of a longer trend that started 
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much earlier. Tracking the territories corresponding to today’s nation-states back in time, 
we see that the fraction with state religions rose somewhat between 1000 and 1300, 
remained high until about 1600, and fell steadily thereafter. The increase in the fraction 
from 16 to 23 percent between 1950 and 2000 corresponds to choices made by many new 
states, previously under colonial rule in 1950, when they gained independence during this 
period. 
Table 1.2  Fraction of Territories with a State Religion between 1000 and 2000 
Year Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Obs. 
1000 0.83 0.38 124 
1100 0.85 0.36 125 
1200 0.82 0.39 125 
1300 0.88 0.32 128 
1400 0.83 0.37 133 
1500 0.88 0.33 146 
1550 0.88 0.32 163 
1600 0.87 0.34 165 
1650 0.76 0.43 182 
1700 0.75 0.43 187 
1750 0.76 0.43 188 
1800 0.72 0.45 190 
1850 0.58 0.49 195 
1900 0.33 0.47 204 
1950 0.16 0.36 204 
2000 0.23 0.42 204 
 
Measuring state religion through a binary variable as an all or nothing choice has 
limitations. State and religion are of course related to each other in numerous complex 
dimensions. Reviewing the limitations of previous measures of government involvement in 
religion developed by other researchers, Fox (2008) has built a massive new dataset that 
includes variables on several aspects of this involvement and on the separation of religion and 
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state for the period between 1990 and 2008. He has classified five types of government 
involvement in religion, one of which is the official role of religion in the state, measured on 
an 8 point scale ranging from state hostility towards religion to having an official religion. 
Although we recognize the limitations of reducing the official role of religion to a binary 
variable, we have no choice but to measure the presence of state religion in this simplified 
form because the information on all possibilities in Fox’s scale are not available for our 
period. 
Nevertheless, we test the robustness of our binary variable as a measure of state 
involvement in religion by using three other dummy variables in our dataset to construct an 
index of this involvement. These variables ask whether the religious authorities were 
appointed by the political authority (=1 if yes), whether their salaries were paid by the 
political authority (=1 if yes), and whether their property and buildings were owned by the 
political authority (=1 if yes). We took the simple average of these variables as an index of 
state involvement in religion, as seen in Table 1.3. 
As Table 1.3 shows, all three measures of state involvement in religion have followed 
the same broad trend over time. Specifically, they rose steadily until about 1550, remained 
high until about 1800, and fell thereafter. These trends were therefore broadly the same as 
those observed for the fraction of state religion in Table 1.2. The correlation coefficient 
between the fraction of state religion and the index of state involvement of religion (the simple 
average of Appoint, Salary, and Property variables) is 0.75, confirming that “State Religion” 
as a simple binary variable is a robust measure of the relationship between state and religion.  
13  
 
Table 1.3 State’s Involvement in Religion 
Year Appoint Salary Property Average 
1000 0.37 0.53 0.56 0.49 
1100 0.34 0.53 0.55 0.48 
1200 0.34 0.53 0.54 0.47 
1300 0.35 0.56 0.57 0.49 
1400 0.39 0.59 0.60 0.52 
1500 0.47 0.66 0.67 0.60 
1550 0.58 0.73 0.73 0.68 
1600 0.57 0.72 0.72 0.67 
1650 0.60 0.69 0.68 0.66 
1700 0.60 0.69 0.69 0.66 
1750 0.60 0.69 0.69 0.66 
1800 0.58 0.65 0.65 0.63 
1850 0.48 0.55 0.54 0.52 
1900 0.32 0.37 0.34 0.34 
1950 0.19 0.23 0.16 0.19 
2000 0.18 0.29 0.13 0.20 
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1.2.1 Differences among Religious Traditions 
Going beyond broad observations, we now examine whether the observed trends in 
the rise and fall of the aggregate fraction of state religion varied among religious traditions. 
Table 1.4 shows how the fractions of state religion changed over time when broken down by 
majority religions (same categories as in Table 1.1). 
Lands occupied by majority Muslim populations started off our period dominated by 
state religions, and they maintained this high level of official monopolies until about 1800. 
Although the Christian world also started the period with a very high fraction of state 
religions, the fraction started to fall after about 1600, two centuries before the decline began in 
the Islamic world. The decline was sharp in both religious traditions after about 1800. 
The fraction of state religions was similarly high in the Buddhist world and remained 
so until about the middle of the nineteenth century. In populations with other eastern 
religions, by contrast, the fraction of state religion was significantly lower than that in the 
Buddhist world until the twentieth century. 
Although the fractions of state religion followed clear patterns in the Buddhist, 
Christian, and Muslim worlds during our period, no similar patterns existed on average in 
other religious traditions. In general, the fractions of state monopolies were lower in these 
other traditions as compared to the Buddhist, Christian, and Muslim traditions, the latter of 
which are classified as missionary and universal religions. We examine the reasons for this 
observation in more detail through regression analysis below. As a final observation on 
differences among religious traditions, note that the early rise in the aggregate state religiosity 
in the world that was seen in Table 1.1 came not from the Christian, Buddhist, or Muslim 
world, but mainly from the rise of religious monopolies in societies whose majority religions 
15  
were traditional African religions. 
 
1.2.2 Differences across Continents 
We now turn to geographic differences in the presence of state religion. Table 1.5 
shows the fractions of states with religious monopolies in the five continents. Consistent with 
the patterns observed in Table 1.4, the fraction of state religion was initially high in Europe 
due to the dominance of Christianity, and similarly high in Asia due to Muslim and Buddhist 
populations. A pattern that becomes clearer in Table 1.5 is the high fraction of state religion 
in the Western hemisphere under polities that ruled prior to colonization. The fraction of state 
religion was initially low in Africa, but rose significantly until about 1300 due to the rising 
influence of Islam in the north, and the establishment of polities with state monopolies in 
religion in the continent as a whole. Throughout our period, the fraction of state religion was 
still lower in Africa than in Asia and Europe.  
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Table 1.4 Fraction of State Religion in Different Traditions over Time 
 
 
 
Year 
 
Traditional 
African 
 
 
Buddhist 
 
Other 
Eastern 
 
 
Christian 
 
 
Muslim 
 
Other 
Religion 
1000 0.33 0.86 0.71 0.98 1.00 0.74 
1100 0.44 1.00 0.67 0.95 1.00 0.80 
1200 0.50 1.00 0.50 0.96 0.90 0.71 
1300 0.60 1.00 0.75 0.94 1.00 0.75 
1400 0.58 0.90 0.50 0.90 1.00 0.70 
1500 0.61 0.91 0.50 0.96 1.00 0.87 
1550 0.59 0.82 0.50 0.95 1.00 0.80 
1600 0.55 0.82 0.43 0.95 1.00 0.57 
1650 0.48 0.82 0.44 0.78 0.95 0.43 
1700 0.58 0.75 0.56 0.73 0.95 0.67 
1750 0.58 0.75 0.56 0.74 0.95 0.60 
1800 0.63 0.83 0.56 0.67 0.90 0.50 
1850 0.54 0.77 0.57 0.49 0.80 0.50 
1900 0.09 0.46 0.57 0.32 0.45 0.29 
1950 0.20 0.08 0.33 0.13 0.16 0.43 
2000 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.13 0.55 0.22 
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Table 1.5 Fraction of State Religion across Continents 
 
 
Year 
 
 
Africa 
 
 
Asia 
 
 
Europe 
 
 
Oceania 
 
Western 
Hemisphere 
1000 0.58 0.89 0.95 0.50 0.70 
1100 0.68 0.89 0.93 0.50 0.86 
1200 0.74 0.79 0.93 0.50 0.71 
1300 0.79 0.94 0.93 0.50 0.71 
1400 0.75 0.86 0.88 0.50 0.86 
1500 0.75 0.88 0.95 0.50 1.00 
1550 0.76 0.88 0.95 0.50 0.97 
1600 0.74 0.88 0.95 0.50 0.91 
1650 0.67 0.84 0.98 0.50 0.55 
1700 0.71 0.86 0.95 0.67 0.50 
1750 0.71 0.86 0.95 0.67 0.51 
1800 0.74 0.84 0.82 0.50 0.49 
1850 0.66 0.76 0.77 0.29 0.20 
1900 0.14 0.61 0.50 0.00 0.15 
1950 0.08 0.22 0.25 0.00 0.13 
2000 0.22 0.37 0.23 0.00 0.13 
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1.2.3 Differences between Dependent and Self-Ruled Territories 
The presence of state religion may differ systematically between the dependent and 
self- ruled territories. By a “dependent” territory, we mean lands that were colonized or 
appended by an external authority, typically from a different ethnic background than the 
majority of the population, and therefore could not have decided on their own whether to have 
a state religion. This applied broadly to colonies, protectorates, client states, and other forms of 
dependency relationships in which a territory was subordinate to an external, more powerful 
authority.
2 By this definition all European colonies in the Western Hemisphere would be 
classified as dependent, as would the Balkans or Arab territories in the Ottoman Empire and 
Eastern Europe under the Soviet Union. Postponing to the next section the analysis of forces 
affecting the adoption of state religion, here we examine whether the adoption patterns 
differed systematically between the dependent and self-ruled territories. 
As seen in Table 1.6, until about 1600 the fraction of state religion was mostly higher 
among dependent territories than independent ones. The inequality was systematically 
reversed after 1600, as the fraction became higher among self-ruled as compared to 
dependent territories. These comparisons indicate that the forces affecting the adoption of 
state religion operated differently between the two groups and changed over time.  
                                                     
2
 By keeping the definition of “dependent” broad, we seek to avoid difficulties surrounding the classification of 
states and territories into controversial categories. For a discussion of these difficulties and controversies, see 
Goldstein and Pevehouse (2014). 
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Table 1.6 State Religion in Self-Ruled vs. Dependent Territories 
 Self-Ruled Dependent 
Year Number of 
Territories in 
Sample 
Fraction 
with 
State 
Religion 
Number of 
Territories in 
Sample 
Fraction 
with 
State 
Religion 
1000 59 0.83 65 0.83 
1100 59 0.81 66 0.88 
1200 68 0.79 57 0.84 
1300 67 0.87 61 0.90 
1400 74 0.85 59 0.81 
1500 72 0.85 74 0.91 
1550 54 0.80 109 0.93 
1600 53 0.81 112 0.89 
1650 53 0.83 129 0.73 
1700 55 0.80 132 0.73 
1750 56 0.80 132 0.73 
1800 54 0.76 136 0.70 
1850 74 0.61 121 0.57 
1900 60 0.47 144 0.27 
1950 80 0.28 124 0.08 
2000 204 0.22 0  
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1.3 Why State Religion? 
We now turn to our second question: why some societies have adopted a state religion. 
Barro and McCleary (2005) used a Hotelling spatial competition model to examine the 
likelihood of monopoly in the religion market and used cross-national data to identify forces 
that affected the likelihood of state religion in 1970 and 2000. Among other results, they have 
found the likelihood to be positively correlated with the adherence rate to the main religion. In 
previous work (Cosgel and Miceli, 2009, 2013; Cosgel, Miceli, and Rubin, 2012a,b) we have 
proposed a political economy approach to religion that was centered on the legitimizing 
relationship between political and religious authorities. In particular, we have argued that state 
religion is more likely, all else equal, if religion is able to confer legitimacy on the ruler, for 
example, by declaring the sovereign divine, or at least divinely inspired. Consistent with Barro 
and McCleary’s approach (2005), we have also argued that a polity dominated by a single 
religion is more conducive to state religion than is a competitive religion market, all else equal, 
because a monopoly religion will command the allegiance of a greater fraction of the populous. 
For an empirical analysis of the presence of state religion in history, we implement 
these ideas through the following equation: 
 
𝑆  = 𝛽 + 𝛽 𝐶  + 𝛽 𝑋  + 𝛿 + 𝜇 + 𝑢   
 
where 𝑆   stands for the presence of state religion in territory i at time t, 𝐶   is a measure 
of concentration in the religion market, 𝛿  is United Nation’s region fixed effect. 𝜇  is the time 
fixed effect. 𝑋   is a vector of other exogenous variables, and 𝑢   is time and country specific 
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error term. 
There is an endogeneity problem in estimation this equation by OLS. It seems 
reasonable to suppose that the rulers will often have the ability to affect the nature of the 
religion market, either by tolerating entry of different religions, or by suppressing competing 
religions so as to maintain (or create) monopoly power on the part of the dominant religion. If 
a regime expects to receive greater legitimacy from increased concentration of influence that a 
single religion can have on the population, the ruler will have an interest in promoting 
monopoly in the religion market by suppressing entry.   
We use an instrumental variables approach to deal with the problem of endogeneity. 
More specifically, we include variables on whether the majority religion is one of the 
universal/missionary religions, which are known to have an internal dynamic towards 
expansion and dominance across national boundaries. Scholars of religion, including Max 
Mueller in a lecture in 1873 and Ugo Bianchi over a century later in an entry on the history of 
religions in The Encyclopedia of Religion, classified religions into two categories (Sharma, 
2012). The first category consists of Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam, which he calls the 
“universal” or missionary religions of the world “because they are not linked to blood, racial, 
ethnic, or national groups, and anyone can join them.” In addition, these religions shared the 
distinct characteristics that each was “founded by a historic person who synthesized a variety 
of teachings current during his lifetime and created a new path,” provided “saints or other 
intermediaries to help believers reach or realize salvation,” and offered ways to “address and 
deal with the everyday problems and insecurities that people are experiencing.” (Johnson and 
Johnson, 2007: 6-7). The universalism of Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam is easy to see 
from the enormous expansion of these religions over time in Table 1.1. Whereas in the year 
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1000 their adherents constituted the majority in 76 (37%) of the 204 territories corresponding 
to today’s nation states, the number rose to 184 (90%) by 2000. 
The incidence of Buddhism, Christianity, or Islam as majority religion is a valid 
instrument for concentration in the religion market because they are partially correlated with 
concentration, and they do not appear as separate regressors in the regression equation. Based 
on the basic characteristics of universal religions and the information in Table 1.1, it is 
reasonable to assume a partial correlation between observing them as majority religions in 
polities and high concentration in their religion markets. As our results on first-stage 
regressions below show, this assumption seems justified. The exclusion condition is also 
satisfied because there is no direct causal link, such as theological justification for a ruler’s 
legitimacy, between universal religions and the presence of state religion. The only link is 
through the concentration channel, i.e., the greater ability of religion to legitimize in highly 
concentrated markets. 
To control for unobserved effects due to changes over time, we exploit the time 
dimensions of our panel data. We consider the effects of unit-invariant changes over time by 
including fixed effects for the “Year” variable. Each year contains various unobserved 
temporal characteristics, such as available technology and knowledge, which can be viewed 
as (roughly) constant among units. Through year fixed effects, we are able to control for 
secular trends in the world that caused the presence of state religion to change over time. 
We account for unobserved heterogeneity among units by including region controls. 
We focus on variation at the broader regional level rather than among units, because the basic 
units of our data are the territories of today’s nation states, which were not always distinct, 
well- defined political entities. (Possible exceptions are island nations and others with clear 
23  
boundaries.) Moreover, the heterogeneity among these territories has not remained constant 
over time because of numerous idiosyncratic changes in political systems, population 
characteristics (e.g., migration), and overall institutional structures. It is more reasonable to 
focus on broader regions that shared (roughly) constant characteristics in climate and natural 
resources during our period. To control for unobserved geographic effects, we use the United 
Nations classification of the world’s regions, consisting of 22 categories that divide continents 
into smaller units (e.g., Northern Africa, Western Europe) with shared characteristics. 
Exogenous variables include a dummy variable on whether the religion of political 
rulers was different from the majority of the population (=1 if yes). This could clearly happen 
in dependent territories, or even in self-ruled ones in which the ruling class belonged to a 
religious minority (e.g., a Shia Arab leader in a predominantly Sunni Arab territory). In such 
cases, our theory would predict a negative effect of this difference on the presence of state 
religion. Since the political legitimacy of the ruler in a colony would presumably depend more 
on military power or other sources of legitimacy than religious loyalty, we would expect the 
ruler to invest more in military superiority or other sources of legitimacy than on establishing 
a state religion. 
Based on the systematic differences observed in Table 1.6 between the self-ruled and 
dependent territories in the adoption of state religion, we ran separate regressions for these 
subsets of data. In regressions for dependent territories, we included a set of dummy variables 
for the ten major empires that ruled during this period (British, Danish, Dutch, French, 
German, Ottoman, Portuguese, Russian, Spanish, and Swedish) to eliminate the effect of 
systematic differences in their imperial policies. Empires could differ in patterns of expansion, 
policies on settlement and missionary activities, exploitation of resources, and whether to 
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transplant their own institutions into conquered territories. We consider the impact of these 
differences on the presence of state religion in dependent territories by including dummy 
variables for the empires that had the largest numbers of colonies. 
Our results on independent territories are displayed in Table 1.7. The dependent 
variable in all equations is the presence of state religion (=1 if yes). The first three columns 
show the results from OLS estimation, where each column corresponds to a different set of 
region and year fixed effects. The next three columns show the results of the Instrumental 
Variables method of estimation when we use universal religions as an instrument for market 
domination by a single religion, as discussed above.
3
 The first stage results show a strong 
relationship between universal religions and the presence of a single religion, with an R-
squared of 0.27, controlling for other exogenous variables included in the analysis. The 
coefficients (robust standard errors) of specific religions are 0.44 (0.07) for Islam and 0.22 
(0.08) for Buddhism, both of which are significantly more likely than Christianity (the 
reference category) to result in a single religion, all else equal. 
The results support the argument made earlier about the greater likelihood of state 
religion in polities dominated by a single religion. The coefficient of “Concentrated Religion 
Market” is positive and highly significant in all equations as predicted. The coefficient falls 
as region controls and year fixed effects are included, indicating that some of the variation in 
state religion is due to systematic differences between regions and over time. But the 
remaining effect after removing unobserved variation is still positive and significant. 
The coefficient of “Political Ruler Different Religion” (=1 if different religion) is not 
                                                     
3
 If adherence data was available i.e. for 1900, 1950, and 2000), we defined a territory as having a concentrated 
religion market (single religion dummy) if more than two-thirds of the population adhered to a single religion. For 
earlier periods, we used the secondary historical literature discussed earlier to determine the presence of a single 
dominant religion. 
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consistent across equations, an interesting result that is observed with both estimation 
methods. Among the OLS results, whereas the coefficient is positive and somewhat significant 
in the first equation, the significance disappears when the region controls are introduced, and 
the coefficient becomes negative and significant, as expected, with time fixed effects. We get 
comparable results from the IV method, as the positive but insignificant coefficient becomes 
negative and significant with region and time effects. These observations indicate that the 
coefficient of this variable in the first equation overstated the effect of the difference in 
religion between the political authority and the majority of the population due to omitted 
variable bias caused by this variable’s correlation with time. When the bias is removed with 
year fixed effects, the coefficient became negative as expected. 
Table 1.8 shows how the results differ when we run the same regressions in dependent 
territories. In the Instrumental Variable estimation, the first stage results show a somewhat 
weaker relationship between universal religions and the presence of a single religion in this 
case as compared to self-ruled territories, with a lower R-squared of 0.22. The difference 
among universal religions becomes smaller and less significant in this case than in the above, 
as can be seen from the coefficients (robust standard errors) of the difference from 
Christianity (the reference category), which are 0.13 (0.06) for Islam and 0.03 (0.09) for 
Buddhism, controlling for other exogenous variables.
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Table 1.7 State Religion in Self-Ruled Territories 
 
Ordinary Least Squares Two-Stage Least Squares (IV) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Concentrated market 0.194 0.187 0.111 0.053 0.492 0.299 
 
(0.030)*** (0.029)*** (0.027)*** -0.115 (0.115)*** (0.096)*** 
Political ruler different religion 0.111 0.008 -0.142 0.058 0.079 -0.089 
 
(0.044)** -0.043 (0.039)*** -0.062 -0.054 (0.049)* 
       Region Controls Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
       Year Fixed Effect 
 
Yes 
  
Yes 
       Constant 0.512 0.463 0.675 0.604 0.264 0.552 
 
(0.026)*** (0.057)*** (0.063)*** (0.077)*** (0.092)*** (0.083)*** 
       
R-squared 0.04 0.22 0.4 0.02 0.14 0.37 
Observations 1140 1140 1140 1140 1140 1140 
 
Notes: 
1. The dependent variable is presence of state religion (=1 if yes). 
2. Figures in parentheses are the robust standard 
errors. 3. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
There are two striking results in Table 1.8 that are different from those observed in 
Table 1.7, but which are entirely consistent with our argument about the relationship between 
the sources of ruler’s legitimacy and the adoption of state religion. The coefficient of 
“Concentrated Religion Market” in dependent territories is positive and significant in the first 
two equations but becomes insignificant when we include dummy variables for empires. This 
indicates that the adoption of state religion in dependent colonies is highly correlated with 
imperial policies, which is not surprising. The coefficient of Single Religion in the first two 
equations thus overstates the importance of the structure of the local religion market because it 
is apparently overshadowed by colonial policies in determining whether to impose state 
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religion. 
Table 1.8 State Religion in Dependent Territories 
 
Ordinary Least Squares Two-Stage Least Squares (IV) 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Concentrated religion market 0.258 0.114 0.025 0.477 -0.299 0.322 
       
 
(0.028)*** (0.022)*** -0.019 -0.414 -0.432 -0.229 
       Political ruler different religion  -0.244 -0.183 -0.09 -0.216 -0.197 -0.09 
       
 
(0.023)*** (0.020)*** (0.018)*** (0.057)*** (0.028)*** (0.019)*** 
       Region controls 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
       Year fixed effects 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
       Empire controls 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
       Constant 0.604 0.785 0.906 0.433 1.158 0.633 
 
(0.028)*** (0.054)*** (0.076)*** -0.325 (0.393)*** (0.222)*** 
       
R-squared  0.15 0.51 0.73 0.1 0.38 0.66 
Observations 1,522 1,522 1,522 1,522 1,522 1,522 
        
Notes: 
1. The dependent variable is presence of state religion (=1 if yes). 
2. Figures in parentheses are the robust standard 
errors. 3. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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The other striking and different result in Table 1.8 is the consistently negative and 
significant coefficient of the religious difference between political rulers and the majority of 
the population. Although the rulers of dependent territories did not have to have a different 
religion than the native populations, they often did. This was always the case in European 
colonies in Africa, Oceania, and the Western Hemisphere, a high fraction of the territories in 
our sample. As noted above, we would expect the religious differences between the colonizers 
and the majority of the population to have a strong negative effect on the presence of state 
religion in these territories, because we would expect these rulers to receive legitimacy from 
force rather than religious loyalty. Our results confirm these expectations. 
 
1.5 Conclusion 
Economists have long studied the role of religion in society, regarding both the 
religious behavior of individuals and the nature of religious institutions. Until recently, 
however, systematic empirical analysis of religion has largely been limited to the modern era 
because of the lack of good historical data. For example, conclusions about the nature of the 
relationship between religion and the state have focused on the twentieth century. The purpose 
of this paper has been to offer some preliminary evidence concerning the nature and causes of 
the religion- state relationship going back over 1,000 years. Such an analysis is now possible 
using a unique pair of data sets that includes information on political, geographic, and religious 
information on over 500 polities that have existed throughout history, beginning in the year 
1000.  The results offer insights into the long term trends in state religion as well as the factors 
that have affected that relationship through time. 
As for trends, our data reveals that the downward trend in state religion observed by 
29  
Barro and McCleary (2005) for the twentieth century is a continuation of a longer-term trend 
that began 300-400 years ago, though with a slight uptick in recent times. Prior to that, state 
religion was prevalent and fairly steady or rising. Further, we find that Christian states began 
the secularization process about two centuries earlier than did Islamic and Bhuddist states. 
Observed differences in this trend by continent reflect geographic differences in the 
distribution of these major religions. 
As to the causes of the decline, Barro and McCleary hypothesize that it reflects a 
modern trend toward increasing openness or competition in the religion market. We augment 
this explanation with a political economy argument that emphasizes the role of religion 
throughout history as one way of providing legitimacy for political leaders. We hypothesize 
that when religion is a cheaper source of legitimacy than, say, military force, it will be in the 
interest of rulers to ally with religious authorities. A monopolized religion market is 
conducive to this objective because it increases the fraction of the populous that a given 
religious leader can deliver. Thus, the two explanations are complementary.  The data provide 
support for both factors throughout the long sweep of history. 
While we believe that the preceding conclusions shed considerable light on the 
historical relationship between state and religion, they leave many questions unanswered. 
Some of these questions may lie beyond the scope of economics, such as the impact of 
doctrinal differences across religions. Other questions, however, are simply awaiting the 
availability of better data. We believe that formulating and answering those questions provides 
a rich agenda for future work. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Although religion has played a large part in violent conflicts, the reasons for this 
association are far from clear. We cannot simply attribute violence to religious beliefs because 
all major religions foster peace and cooperation in fundamental tenets. Many civil conflicts in 
modern times have been between parties that differ along religious lines or they involve groups 
that define themselves through religious affiliation. Since religious differences do not always 
result in conflicts, however, we need to delve deeper into their causes to distinguish between 
those that result in civil conflicts of today and those that produce peaceful coexistence. As 
McBride and Richardson (2012, p. 118)) note in their review of the literature on religion and 
conflict, “[m]ore work is warranted” to understand the religious roots of civil conflict. 
This chapter will study the association between religion and civil conflict by examining 
how religious differences between the political rulers and segments of population in history 
contribute to levels of civil conflict today. I develop a political economy model in which the 
ruler’s choices of public good and the access to it in a religiously segmented economy are linked 
to the civil conflict through grievances.
4
 The model includes a ruler and two types of citizens that 
differ based on whether they share the same religion with the ruler. For an argument based on 
economic incentives rather than unusual preferences, the model makes standard assumptions 
about the preferences and motivations of rulers and citizens. In a dynamic setting, the ruler 
chooses the level of public good as well as the access to it, and citizens choose private 
investment as a function of the ruler’s choice. 5  The ruler may favor co-religionist group in his 
                                                     
4
 For models of the legitimizing relationship between rulers and society, see Cosgel et al (2009) and Cosgel et al 
(2012) 
5
 This formulation is consistent with Mitra and Ray’s (2014) arguments about the Hindu-Muslim violence in India.   
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choice because of the higher tax revenue he may expect to receive from co-religionists through 
the higher tax compliance due to the greater legitimacy that shared religion may provide. This 
differential treatment creates grievances among disfavored group and may create conflict at some 
point as the accumulation of historical grievances motivate the disfavored group to fight against 
the ruler if the cost of fighting is reasonably low. The accumulation of grievances may vary 
depending on the size of religiously different groups and their tax compliance which may be the 
function of the characteristics of religions.  
 To examine the model’s implication empirically, I use a new dataset on the religious and 
political histories of today's nations since the year 1000. The dataset includes variables on the 
religion of the political rulers and the majority and minority
6
 religions of the population for a 
given country. Using this information, I construct a new index to serve as a proxy for 
accumulated grievances for each country, called the Historical Religious Difference Index 
(HRDI), to analyze the way historical differences between the religion of the rulers and the 
majority religion or the minority religion have affected current (post-1960) levels of civil 
conflict. The results show that the frequency of civil conflict in the post-1960 period was 
significantly higher in societies that have historically had minority religions that differed from 
the religions of the rulers and that the effect depended on the characteristics of religions. The 
results hold when differences in geographic and bio diversity of countries and historical factors 
such as colonialism and transition to agriculture are controlled for. 
The argument is closely related to the relative deprivation theory in sociology.  
According to this theory, individuals or social groups who may not be deprived in absolute terms 
may still feel deprived when their situation is worse as compared to others and that their relative 
                                                     
6
 This is not any minority but a significant minority or second majority religion. 
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deprivation can accumulate grievances that may eventually fire up conflict. Relative deprivations 
leading to grievances might stem from government policy, historical or cultural reasons that 
create lack of economic, political and social rights for certain groups in society (Gurr, 1993; Gurr 
et al., 1970).
7
 Applying this framework to contemporary religious deprivations, Grim and Finke 
(2010) illustrate that governmental and social restrictions on religious freedom is positively 
correlated with religious persecution, a particular form of social conflict.  The results contribute 
to this literature by providing a specific mechanism for the source of those grievances and a way 
of measuring them through a proxy index. 
The analysis is also closely related to the economic literature on the relationship between 
diversity and conflict.
 8
 Researchers in this literature have shown how conflict in a diverse 
society arises out of the difficulty of reconciling the demands for public good provision of 
different groups under scarcity. If the demands of some groups are unsatisfied, they may develop 
grievances that may lead to civil conflict. These kinds of grievance-related explanations are 
empirically tested in the literature through measures of diversity, such as ethnic and religious 
fractionalization (large number of small groups), polarization (small number of large groups), 
and dominance (a large group together with significant small group) based on data on the 
religious distributions of population. The findings are mixed and largely inconclusive (Arbatli et 
al., 2015; Basedau et al., 2014; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Esteban et al., 2012; Fearon and 
Laitin, 2003; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005). By emphasizing the deep roots of the 
diversity and grievance between religious groups and political rulers, the paper contributes to this 
literature a new mechanism through which accumulated grievances may lead to violent conflicts.  
The argument is also related to a body of literature that explains conflict through religion-
                                                     
7
 For a review of grievance literature and examples, see (Cederman et al., 2013) 
8
 For reviews of this literature and examples, see Blattman and Miguel (2010), Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2007). 
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based hatred and irreconcilable hostility between groups (Horowitz, 1985; Huntington and 
others, 1993). Rather than considering the hatred and hostility as being a matter of current 
religious beliefs and preferences, I examine their historical roots. Using a political economy 
approach, I identify the source of the problem in the self-interested ruler who is trying to 
maximize his revenue. Going beyond general observations, I construct an index to measure the 
source and intensity of the grievance and to examine its effect on violence systematically.  
My emphasis on the historical origins of conflict is consistent with the recent literature on 
the deep historical roots of economic growth and development.
9
  In this literature, scholars have 
shifted emphasis from the proximate determinants of current outcomes to more fundamental 
factors deeply rooted in long-term history. I contribute to this literature by providing the first 
systematic analysis and empirical measure of the deep religious roots of current conflicts. In 
doing so, my approach is similar to  Persson and Tabellini’s (2009) analysis of how the 
accumulation of democratic capital contributes to economic development, and (Bockstette et al., 
2002)and  Depetris-Chauvin’s (2013) studies of how the accumulation of institutional experience 
under a state-level governance affects economic growth and civil conflict.   
2.2 Model 
This part develops a political economy model in which the ruler’s choices of public good 
and the access to it are linked to the civil conflict through grievances in a religiously segmented 
society. The model builds on insights from Acemoglu (2005) and Cosgel and Miceli (2009). I 
use the basic setup of Acemoglu (2005) to formulate how the ruler may discriminate among 
segments of the population in their access to the public good. I focus segmentation of the 
                                                     
9
 For a review of this literature, see Spolaore and Wacziarg (2013). For examples of the related analysis of historical, 
cultural and institutional factors, see Engerman and Sokoloff (1997), Laporta et al. (1997), (Acemoglu et al., 2001), 
Nunn (2014) 
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population according to religious affiliation and the differential abilities of religious groups to 
legitimize political rulers (Cosgel and Miceli, 2009). I expand on these insights by specifying 
why self-interested rulers may discriminate along religious lines and how this discrimination 
may lead to grievances that arise from the differences between the religion of the ruler and 
various segments of the population. I also show how the accumulation of grievances varies 
depending on the size of religious groups and their tax compliance to tax collection process. I use 
the model to identify the mechanisms through which religious differences may lead to conflict 
and to specify testable hypotheses for empirical analysis. 
 2.2.1 Setup 
Consider a discrete time infinite horizon economy with a ruler and citizens. The 
population of citizens is normalized to 1 and consists of two types   and  , indicating that 
citizens have the same religion as the ruler’s and different religion from the ruler’s, respectively. 
There are   number of type   citizens and       number of type   citizens in the economy and  
  is equal to 
 
 
 initially. I also assume that ruler will not change his religion. 
Citizens are risk neutral and each citizen’s utility function is given by 
  
 = ∑ 𝛽     
  
          =     (1) 
where 𝛽 is discount factor,     
  is the consumption of citizen  . Each citizen produces 
final good   
  for his consumption at each date   using the following Cobb-Douglas production 
technology with constant return to scale. 
  
 = {
 
   
      
    
                        =  
 
   
          
    
             =  
  (2) 
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where   
  is citizen  ’s  effort or investment level.     denotes the public good choice of 
the ruler at time    .     is in the citizen’s production function and it  captures the idea that the 
certain level of public good in the economy (e.g. infrastructure and law enforcement) is 
necessary for the citizen to be productive.
10
 I will argue that the ruler can regulate access to 
public goods. For that matter, these are not pure public goods which have non-excludability and 
non-rivalry properties. But they are ruler’s choices that affect the productivity of each citizen in 
the economy.
11          is the favor variable that the ruler chooses to regulate the access to the 
public good.
12     may denote favoritism that makes occupational and educational opportunities 
in the economy more available for a certain group because of their religious identity. In 
particular, if the choice of    is less than  
 
 
 , the ruler is favoring type   citizens, and if greater 
than 
 
 
 , the ruler is favoring type   citizens. The self-interested ruler may have an incentive to 
favor type   citizens in his choice because of the higher tax revenue he may expect to receive 
from co-religionists due to the greater legitimacy that shared religion may provide. 
The ruler collects taxes and makes public good investments. The tax rate is    , and it is 
given in each date  . However, a fraction 𝛿  of income lost in the tax collection process due to tax 
compliance issue.
13
 Tax compliance varies depending on the religion of citizens. Specifically, we 
assume  𝛿  𝛿  which reflects the argument of Cosgel and Miceli (2009) that the ruler is more 
legitimate among type   citizen than type   citizens. 
                                                     
10
 For this kind of argument see Barro (1990) 
11
 Later in Chapter 3 I will interpret    as state capacity created by the ruler that is crucial for economic 
development. Specifically, I will conceptualize it as legal capacity, bureaucratic and administrative capacity, and 
infrastructural capacity, then  measure it accordingly.  
12
 For a similar formulation in the context of legal capacity see Besley and Persson (2010). They argue that 
government can choose to protect legal rights of certain groups over others although one can think of the legal 
capacity is public good. 
13
 This is a deadweight lost because 𝛿 fraction of income neither goes to the ruler nor to the citizens. It can also be 
seen as transaction cost of tax collection. Tax compliance issue is widely discussed in public finance literature. For a 
review of this literature see Andreoni et al. (1998). 
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Given the tax rate the consumption of each citizen can be written as 
  
 =         
    
      (3) 
Total tax revenue collected by the ruler at date   is given by 
  =       𝛿     
    
  +         𝛿     
    
      (4) 
By this revenue the ruler spend    to determine the level of public good in the next 
period. 
    = (
      
 
  )
   
          (5) 
where     reflecting the diminishing return to   . Full depreciation for the public good 
is also assumed for simplicity.   
The consumption of the ruler becomes whatever is left over from the tax revenue after 
spending on public good investment.  
  
 =              (6) 
Citizens may get differential treatments from the ruler depending on their religious 
identity. The favor variable    is in citizen’s production function and the choice of which by the 
ruler may create relative deprivation among the groups through utility differences, the 
deprivation that creates grievances and motivates un-favored group to replace the ruler with the 
one who share the same religion. However, the replacement is costly and the cost of which may 
depend on many factors such as technology, charismatic leadership or geography, and is 
therefore assumed to be a random variable. In particular, citizens are faced with a replacement 
cost      at each date   , where    is non-negative continuous random variable with distribution 
function     , which satisfies the monotone hazard rate assumption. It is multiplied by the 
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public good    in the economy. This simplifies the analysis significantly. This also can be true 
because the cost of replacement may increase by public goods such as a well-functioning 
bureaucracy and military or because the cost of replacement decreases by the public good 
investment that elevates citizens’ economic conditions. On the other hand, the benefit of 
replacing the ruler at date   is       (  
    
 ) , utility differential among the groups. This 
utility difference is multiplied by the group size reflecting that there is no collective action 
problem. Citizens make the replacement decision          based on the realization of cost and 
expected benefit of the replacement. The ruler will be replaced if the following is true. 
   |
     (  
    
 )
  
|  (7) 
Condition in (7) implies that the probability of the ruler’s being replaced is         , 
where       
     (  
    
 )
  
  
Timing of the events in the game as follows: 
 Economy inherits public good    from the government spending  from the 
previous period  
 Citizens choose effort level   
  
 The ruler chooses the favor variable    and next periods public good      at date 
   
    is realized 
 Citizens decide whether to replace the ruler or not 
Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) concept is used to solve this game. MPE is defined as 
set of strategies at date   such that these strategies only depend on the payoff-relevant current 
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state of the economy, set of strategies of                          . In MPE 
one can determine equilibrium allocations and strategies within each date by the 
backward induction, taking the state of the economy from the previous period as 
given.
14
 
2.2.2  Citizens’ Problem 
Citizens maximize their utility choosing effort level   
  
Max   
 =         
    
     (8) 
Solution to this problem is the optimal investment or effort level of each citizen as 
follows 
  
 =        (9) 
  
 =            (10) 
Substituting (9) and (10) into (2) gives production levels for each type of citizens as 
  
 =
 
   
       (11) 
  
 =
 
   
         (12) 
Using (9)-(12) citizens’ optimized utility for each type will be 
  
 =
 
   
       (13) 
  
 =
 
   
          (14) 
                                                     
14
 For a discussion about and applications of MPE in political economy context see Acemoglu (2010). 
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2.2.3 Ruler’s problem 
Given the citizens’ investment choice, the ruler’s tax revenue function at date   can be 
written as follows after substituting (13) and (14) into (4) 
      =
 
     
      𝑆 +             (15) 
where  𝑆 =     𝛿    =         𝛿   ,  𝑆      since  𝛿  𝛿 . Again, given 
the citizen’s choice of investment, the probability of replacement in (7) will be         , 
where     =  
      
   
         , obtained by substituting (13) and (14) into (7). 
To find the ruler’s choice of favor variable    and his choice of public good,      under 
replacement threat we write Bellman equation for the ruler’s discounted net present value as 
follows 
  
     =      [   (     )]            
 
      
    
 
 + 𝛽    (     )           
 (16) 
The value function       is concave and continuously differentiable since  >1adds 
required curvature to   .
15
  
First-order condition with respect to    is 
[   (     )] 
   
   
                          + 𝛽           (17) 
The first term is expected revenue brought by higher   . Increasing   , making the public 
good more available for type   citizens, will increase the tax revenue because of the legitimacy 
                                                     
15
 See Stokey et al. (1989) for standard arguments on differentiability and concavity of value function 
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effect. On the other hand, the second term is expected lost due to higher   . Increasing    will 
increase the probability of replacement through the income difference it creates between type   
and   citizens. The optimum    should balance these effects out. 
First order condition with respect to      is  
 
     
    
   
= 𝛽          (18)  
The envelop condition is given as 
        =     (       )  
 
     
 [      𝑆    +  ]  (19) 
Combining (18) and (19) gives the ruler’s optimal investment function as 
     = ([   (       )]𝛽      𝑆 +           )
       
  (20) 
To make further progress let’s focus on steady state equilibrium where   =     =  
   
and     =     =  
 .  
      ([   (     )]𝛽 [   𝑆 +        ])
       
   (21) 
Combining (15) and (20) gives the value function for the ruler at steady state as 
        =     (     )(     ) +     (     ) (
   
 
) 
 (   (     ))     
   (   (     ))
     (22) 
Define        ((     ) + (
   
 
) 
 (   (     ))     
   (   (     ))
  (
 
     
 )  (23) 
      is the normalized value of staying in power for the ruler. To get the expression that 
gives the steady state value for the favor variable    , first combine (16), (17) and (22) dividing 
them by       ,then insert explicit expressions for  
   
   
 and       into (17). Then, the equation 
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that implicitly defines the equilibrium    is obtained as 
 (     )      (   (     ))  
      
      
 =     (24) 
As   increases, the ruler gets the normalized value of staying in power with a lower 
probability (first term in (24)). An increase in  , on the other hand, increases the ruler’s revenue 
due to the legitimacy effect given the ruler is staying in power (second term in (24)). To show 
whether a unique solution exists, it is handy to rewrite (24) as follows 
 (     )
(   (     ))
       
      
      
 =       (25) 
The only asymmetry between type   and   citizens is that they have different 𝛿 values, 
specifically 𝛿  𝛿 . If  𝛿 = 𝛿  , then  
  can be anything within the boundaries of   in terms of 
raising revenue. However, any deviation from    =
 
 
  will increase the probability of 
replacement. Hence, the ruler will set   =
 
 
 as long as  𝛿 = 𝛿  is true. That is, there is no 
reason for the ruler to discriminate if there no asymmetry among citizens. Further, as long as 
𝛿  𝛿  is true the ruler never set  
  
 
 
. To see this, reduce   =
 
 
 in       by arbitrary small 
number   the benefit of which     𝛿   will be less than the cost of which     𝛿  .
16
 In 
addition, there will be an increase in the probability of replacement by type   citizens through the 
monotone hazard rate. This proves that the ruler only discriminates against type   citizens. The 
solution to (25) is unique because the first terms in (25) are increasing in  . That is,  
 
  
(
 (     )
(   (     ))
)    by monotone hazard rate and  
 
  
(     )    as long as 𝛿  𝛿  is true 
                                                     
16
  To see this, write        in (23) as   
 
   
      𝛿   
 +         𝛿      
    +
   
 
 (   (     ))
   (   (     ))
   .The only 
asymmetry in this equation is different 𝛿 values, specifically 𝛿  𝛿 . 
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just as discussed above.  
These results are intuitive. The revenue-maximizing ruler will make the public goods 
more available for the group that shares the same religion with the ruler because doing so allow 
him to extract more tax revenue due to the legitimacy effect. However, the ruler should not be so 
ambitious for doing so because it becomes more likely that the group that has the different 
religion from the ruler’s will overthrow him if the utility differential among the groups grows 
large due to the discrimination. 
Let’s rewrite the equilibrium probability of replacement of the ruler as a function of the 
parameters of the model as follows:  
    (     )       𝛿                (26) 
where     =
      
   
       .  
Proposition 1: Based on the discussion above, there exists a unique MPE, in which the 
ruler always favors type   citizens and type   citizens replace the ruler whenever (7) is true. In 
the equilibrium 
i.  
    
  
   or     
ii.  
   
   
  , 
iii.  
    
  
=
  
  
 
  
  
+
  
  
   or    
iv.  
    
   
=
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(i) An increase in the population of type    citizens    , has an ambiguous 
effect on the equilibrium level of     . There are two effects, survival and income effects, 
working in opposite directions through the first terms in (25), which is  
 (     )
(   (     ))
     . On the one hand, a higher    leads to an increase in   
through 
 (     )
(   (     ))
 , which I call the survival effect, because it reduces the probability of 
replacement by type   citizens, which encourages the ruler to discriminate more. On the 
other hand, a higher   decreases   through      , which I call the income effect, because 
it generates income for the ruler which he would otherwise generate by using  , a tool 
that is costly to use due to its effect on the probability of replacement. As for the sign 
of 
    
  
, if the survival effect dominates the income effect, the net effect will be positive, 
and vice versa. 
 
(ii) As type   citizens’ compliance parameter   𝛿   goes up,   will go 
up, 
   
   
  . The more type   citizens resist in the tax collection process, the more the 
ruler discriminates against them by switching the availability of public goods to type    
citizens, who are more willing to pay taxes.  
 
(iii) An increase in   has an ambiguous effect on  , the probability of 
replacement.   affects the probability of replacement in two channels: direct population 
and grievance channels. On the one hand, as   goes up, the probability of replacement 
goes down because now there will be less number of type   citizens that could potentially 
47 
 
revolt, which is the direct population channel, 
  
  
  . This is always true since the 
collective action problem is not incorporated in the model. The other effect works 
through  ,  
  
  
 
  
  
, which is the grievance channel. First, it is easy to see  
  
  
    with the 
help of equation (7). Given the comparative static result in (i), if the survival effect 
dominates both the income effect and the direct population effect, the change in the 
probability of replacement due to an increase in population share of type   citizens will 
be positive; and vice versa.  
 
(iv) 𝛿  affects the probability of replacement only through its effect on the 
favor variable   (the grievance channel). As 𝛿  increases, the probability of replacement 
increases because there will be more discrimination due to the result in (ii). 
 
2.2.4 Empirical Implications 
The propositions derived from the model specify certain predictions on the effects of key 
variables on the probability of conflict, which can be tested by empirical analysis. Depending on 
religious segments of the population ( ) and their tax compliance in the tax collection process 
(𝛿), grievances accumulate differently and induce different conflict probabilities. Further, for a 
cross-country comparison, an empirical specification should worry about sorting issue that may 
result from factors such as technology or geographic characteristics of countries that affect the 
effectiveness of public good in private production ( ) as well as the cost of replacement ( ). 
Now, let’s look at the model’s predictions under the following scenarios on how the ruler’s 
religion differs from those of the population. 
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𝐶                𝑢                                                   𝑢       
In this case, the probability of conflict increases due to direct population effect. The more 
people are involved, the easier is to replace the ruler. However, over all change in the probability 
of conflict depends also on the grievance channel. In the grievance channel, if the survival effect 
dominates both the income effect and direct population effect, the probability of conflict goes 
down. In other words, if the ruler cares more about his staying in power and enjoying his future 
revenue, he will not discriminate and cause many grievances because he knows that the future 
replacement would be easy by the majority. As a result, one can expect less conflict due to 
grievances when ruler’s religion is different from the majority.  
 
𝐶                 𝑢                                                   𝑢       
In this case, the probability of conflict decreases due to direct population effect. That is, 
the lesser people are involved, the more difficult is to replace the ruler. However, if the survival 
effect dominates the income effect and as well as direct population effect, the probability of 
conflict increases. In other words, if the ruler cares more about his future revenue, he will 
discriminate more because he knows that the future replacement would be difficult by the 
minority. As a result, one can expect more grievances and conflict when ruler’s religion is 
different from the minority religion. 
Further, in either of above cases the probability of conflict increases as 𝛿  increases. That 
is, holding other things equal, the more type   citizens resist in tax collection process, the more 
the ruler discriminates against them. This creates more grievances, hence increases the 
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probability of conflict. The above discussions are summarized in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1 Parameter Changes and Conflict Prediction 
Form of 
religious 
difference 
Parameter Interpretation Direct 
population 
effect 
Grievance channel Conflict 
prediction 
Income 
effect 
Survival 
effect 
Ruler vs. 
minority 
  Population of 
type s citizens 
<0 <0 >0 If the survival 
effect dominates 
income and direct 
population effect 
as n changes, 
Ruler vs. minority 
yields more 
conflict than  
Ruler vs. majority 
through grievance 
channel . This 
would be true if 
the ruler cares his 
future more. 
Ruler vs. 
majority 
  Population of 
type s citizens 
>0 >0 <0 
Either 
case 
 
𝛿  
Type d citizens’ 
resistance to 
paying  tax 
 >0  
 
An empirical specification should worry about sorting issues as well. Countries may sort 
into cases where ruler’s religion is the same as the population or different from population 
depending on the effectiveness of public good in private production ( ) as well as the cost of 
replacement ( ). These parameters might be function of such variables as technology, geography 
or other characteristics of countries. An empirical specification should control such variables to 
mitigate any bias in estimates due to this potential sorting problem.    
2.3 Data and Empirical Framework 
To test the model’s predictions empirically, I use cross-national data on civil conflict as 
well as other characteristics of each country that are associated with conflict. In addition, I 
introduce a novel dataset that includes information on the historical relationship between the 
religions of political rulers, segments of the population and whether the rulers imposed an 
official state religion. Using this data I constructed a new index to serve as proxy for 
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accumulated grievances. Empirical framework will specify regressions that explain the variation 
in frequency of new civil conflict across countries in the post-1960 period with respect to the 
proxy indices for accumulated grievances.  
2.3.1 Dependent Variable  
Following the common practice in the literature I use UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict 
Dataset v.4-2012 for civil conflict measures (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Harbom and Wallensteen, 
2012). This is a conflict-year dataset that includes two different codings, PRIO25 and PRIO1000. 
In particular, PRIO25 contains internal and internationalized internal armed conflict episodes, 
each of which takes place between government and internal actor(s) and causes at least 25 battle-
related deaths per year. However, PRIO1000 includes those internal and internationalized 
internal conflicts that result in at least 1000 battle-related deaths per year. Using these measures I 
define the dependent variable as the frequency of new PRIO25(1000) civil conflict, not the new 
episodes of old conflicts, in the period between 1960 and 2011.
17
 I use PRIO25 in our main 
analysis and use PRIO1000 to see whether our findings are sensitive to the measure of civil 
conflict. Following the literature, I focus civil conflict in the post-1960 period since most 
colonies obtained their independence by 1960.  
2.3.2 Measuring Grievances:  An Index of Historical Religious Difference between 
State and Citizen (HRDI)  
In the theoretical part I argued that the ruler will discriminate against the segment of 
                                                     
17
 Differentiating between new conflict and new episode of old conflict is important to understand the nature of civil 
conflict. The literature has focused on three dimensions of civil conflict: onset, duration and incidence.  Onset 
studies explain the variation in outbreak of new conflict, not a new episode of old one; but, sometimes new episode 
of old conflict is also incorporated into the analysis if the peace period continues long enough before new episode 
outbreaks.  Studies on durations examine what makes civil war, which already started longer or shorter. Incidence or 
prevalence dimension is mixture of onset and duration. Studies on incidence divide time periods into 5-year intervals 
and define the dependent variable as a dummy variable equal to 1 if a new or a  new episode of old conflict happens 
within a five-year interval. For a detailed discussion see Sambanis (2004). 
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population whose religion is different from the ruler’s by restricting their access to public goods 
(i.e.    
 
 
). In the model this creates grievances as the utility differential between co-religionist 
and the other group, and causes the conflict. To quantify these grievances over time across space 
we should have data on the components of right hand side of the inequality in (7), which is the 
utility differential among the religiously different type of citizens.  However, it is not feasible to 
collect such data. Instead, I look at whether the religion of the ruler is different from that of 
citizens in a given time and territory because grievances eventually arise from such differences 
between the rulers and citizens. I, therefore, created an index that measures the historical 
religious difference between rulers and citizens (HRDI) to serve as proxy for accumulated 
grievances. Using the model’s implications, I further created HRDIs that allows for different 
sizes of religious groups ( ) and the values of tax compliance parameter (𝛿). This provides 
variations across indices that also help estimate the effect of grievances on civil conflict. 
In the construction of HRDI two dimensions are important: the time period and the unit 
of analysis. HRDI is constructed for the period between year 1000 and 1950 because before the 
year 1000 historical information is limited, especially for the new world and Africa, and after 
1950 there would be a reverse causality issue since civil conflict in the post-1960 period will be 
explained in this study. Similar to Bocksette et al (2002) and Depetris-Chauvin(2013) this time 
period is divided into 100-year intervals until 1500 and 50-year intervals thereafter. The unit of 
analysis is territories that today’s countries occupy. In order to construct HRDI, the history of 
each country that exists today is examined. The religion of rulers and that of citizens are spotted 
at each one of those intervals. Citizens’ religions in my analysis can take at most two forms in 
terms of diversity in a given time interval and country: the religion of the majority and the 
religion of the minority since it is unlikely to observe the religious distribution of population as 
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we go back in history. This information comes from CAD (Country Ancestry Data) and HPD 
(Historical Polities Data) datasets that we introduce in detail in Chapter 1.  Then, for each 
country today HRDI is constructed as follows: 
     = ∑ 
        
  
   
 
where  =                                                        
              ,    indexes country, and     is a binary variable equal to 1 if the ruler has 
religion different from that of citizens in country   at interval  .   is a weight parameter, and it is 
initially set equal to 1 since the deep root literature does not provide a theory suggesting what 
value it should take. Later in the empirical analysis, I assign values lower than 1 for   to assess 
how sensitive the results are to the different values of  . 
I calculate various forms of HRDI that take the size of religious groups ( ) and their tax 
compliance behavior (𝛿 ) into account. Regarding ( ), I calculate two indices that account for 
religious composition of population: HRDI1 that measures the historical religious difference 
between rulers and the majority of population, and HRDI2 that measures historical religious 
difference between rulers and the minority of population.  
As for 𝛿 , I calculate SHRDI1 and SHRDI2. They measure the historical religious 
difference between rulers and the majority of population, and the difference between rulers and 
the minority of population, respectively, while rulers have an official state religion. Further, 
following the literature on comparative religion, I categorize religions that are in the dataset into 
two groups: missionary and non-missionary religions. Missionary religions, also called universal 
religions, consist of Islam, Christianity and Buddhism and tend to expand by converting people. 
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On the other hand, non-missionary religions such as ethnic religions (Hinduism, Judaism etc.) 
and indigenous religions are passive in terms of spreading out. Such characteristics of religions 
may contribute to the likelihood of conflict through 𝛿 , as well. Then, I construct HRDI1 and 
HRDI2 when (i) both rulers and citizens have missionary religions, (ii) rulers have missionary 
but citizens have non-missionary religions and vice versa, (iii) both rulers and citizens have non-
missionary religions. These indices are used as main explanatory variables in the regression 
analysis.  
When calculating HRDIs I treat different sects in Islam and Christianity as different 
religions since the focus here is civil conflict, and sectarian differences often are an important 
source of wars.
18
  
Several challenges emerge in the construction of HRDIs. First, since it is not possible to 
observe exact religious distribution of population as we go back in history until the year 1000, I 
only coded the majority and the minority religions in a given polity. If there were several 
minority religions, I picked the significant one. Second, if a given territory was ruled by more 
than one polity at the same time, a representative one is selected, one that controls the most of 
that country’s territory. These challenges create measurement errors that can potentially affect 
my estimates.  
 
 
 
                                                     
18
 See Table 2A. 1 in Appendix A for the list of religions that are present in Historical Polities Dataset. 
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2.3.3  Summary Statistics  
 
Figure 1shows the evolution of majority religions over time across territories that today’s 
countries occupy. Christianity has been the majority religion in most of the countries since the 
year 1000 and it increased faster after the 16
th
 century. This expansion coincides with the 
colonization and the missionary activities of Christians in the new world and Africa. The number 
of countries whose majority religion is Islam has gone up over time as well, but not as sharp as 
Christianity.  In contrast to these expansions, the number of countries where indigenous religions 
are the majority has declined over time, especially after the 16
th
 century. As a result, the number 
of countries where the ruler’s religion is different from the majority of population (RD1) has 
gone up over time. 
 
Figure 2 shows the evolution of minority religions over time across territories that 
today’s countries occupy. The most noticeable change is again with Christianity. The number of 
countries where Christianity is the minority religion went up dramatically during the 18
th
 
century. Similarly, the number of countries where the ruler’s religion is different from the 
minority (RD2) has increased dramatically over time. This development in RD2 is possibly due 
to remaining impacts of the dynamics in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1 Majority Religion and the Religious Difference between the Rulers and the Majority over 
Time 
 
Note: RD1 is Religious difference between the ruler and the majority. For the list of Ethnic and Indigenous religions 
see Table 2A. 1 in Appendix A. 
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Figure 2 Minority Religion and the Religious Difference between the rulers and the Minority over 
Time 
 
Note: RD2 is Religious difference between the ruler and the minority. For the list of Ethnic and Indigenous religions 
see Table 2A.1 in Appendix A. 
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2.3.4  Empirical Framework 
To test the model’s predictions empirically I specify cross-country regressions that 
explain variations across countries in count of new civil conflict as a function of HRDI, the 
proxy for accumulated grievances, in the post-1960 period. 
     + 𝐶   = 𝛽 + 𝛽      + 𝑋 
  + 𝑢  
where 𝐶   is the number of new civil conflicts that started in country   in period 1960-
2011. The dependent variable is      + 𝐶   ) because 𝐶   is a count variable.
19
       is the 
index of the historical religious difference between rulers and citizens for country  , and serves 
as proxy for accumulated grievances. As argued before, I have calculated various forms of HRDI 
based on the model’s predictions on the accumulation of grievances that result from the 
differences in parameters   and 𝛿 . Differences across these indices also provide relevant 
variations to estimate the effect of accumulated grievances on civil conflict. Vector of controls 
 𝑋  
 is added into the regressions to mitigate the heterogeneity across countries that, according to 
the theoretical model, stems from different parameter value of   for each country. 𝑢  is the 
country specific error terms. Civil conflict appears mostly in certain regions of the world such as 
Middle East, Balkans and Southern Asia. The model’s errors for countries in the same region 
may be correlated. To deal with this, I cluster the errors at UN region level. Clustering at the UN 
region level appears to be the most conservative approach for avoiding over-rejection of the null 
hypothesis related to the statistical significance of  𝛽   the coefficient of variable of interest. 
There are twenty-two UN regions for which the clusters are defined. This model is estimated 
using OLS estimator. 
                                                     
19
 Since the dependent variable is a count variable I also use Poisson regression. Poisson regression results are 
similar to OLS results. See Table 2A.3 in Appendix A. 
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2.4 Results 
This part presents empirical findings about the effect of HRDIs, proxy for accumulated 
grievances, on various civil conflict measures. First, I present results from empirical analysis on 
how the historical religious difference between rulers and the majority (HRDI1) as well as 
difference between rulers and the minority (HRDI2) affect civil conflict. Second, I present 
results on whether the characteristics of religions that rulers and citizens have any differential 
effect on the estimates. Then, I show how robust the results are to the change in the weight 
parameter used in the calculation of the indices, the use of different conflict measures, and the 
exclusion of countries from the sample based on UN regions. Then, I conclude introducing well-
known predictors of civil conflict into regressions to see possible mediating channels which the 
indices’ effects may work through. Results show that HRDI2 is positively and significantly 
associated with civil conflict measures and the size of the effect goes up when rulers have had 
official state religions. These results survive after those robustness checks. The findings are also 
consistent with the model’s predictions. 
2.4.1  How do historical religious difference between rulers and citizens affect civil 
conflict? 
In the model grievances accumulate differently depending on the value of  , about which I 
calculated two indices using the historical data: whether the religion of rulers is different from 
that of majority (HRDI1) and the religion of rulers is different from that of significant minority 
(HRDI2), historically. Table 2.2 shows the effects of these indices on the frequency of new 
PRIO25 civil conflict for the period 1960-2011. Columns 1 and 4 reveal bivariate relationships 
between HRDI1 and the civil conflict and HRDI2 and the civil conflict, respectively. These 
relationships are positive; but they are statistically insignificant. Clearly, these estimates are 
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Table 2.2 OLS Estimates of Effect of HRDI1 and HRDI2 on PRIO25 Civil Conflict 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES          
          
HRDI1 0.0167 0.000346 -0.00606 -0.00743     -0.00442 
 (0.0115) (0.0105) (0.0107) (0.00982)     (0.00987) 
HRDI2     0.0247 0.0206* 0.0243** 0.0237* 0.0240** 
     (0.0149) (0.0104) (0.0109) (0.0114) (0.0106) 
          
Observations 176 147 142 127 176 147 142 127 142 
R-squared 0.023 0.494 0.589 0.648 0.039 0.515 0.616 0.671 0.617 
Foreign Ruler no yes yes yes no yes yes yes yes 
Continent Dummy no yes yes yes no yes yes yes yes 
Geo&Bio Diversity no yes yes yes no yes yes yes yes 
Historical Factors no no yes yes no no yes yes yes 
Technology no no no yes no no no yes no 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at UN region level are in parentheses. * represents p-values: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable is logarithm of count 
of new civil conflicts in period 1960-2011, obtained from UCDP Armed Conflict Data. HRDI1 is Historical Religious Difference Index calculated when the ruler’s religion is 
different from the majority religion. HRDI2 is Historical Religious Difference Index calculated when the ruler’s religion is different from the minority religion. Foreign Ruler 
measures how many times a country in history is ruled by rulers originated from other countries. For the definition and the source of other controls see   
Appendix A 
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contaminated by omitted variable bias. Countries may experience the religious differences as 
well as conflict due to various reasons such as invasion, migration or replacements of rulers by 
revolutions.  These reasons may correlate with countries’ economic, geographical and social 
conditions. Next, I will control variables on such conditions in the regressions.  
In Table 2.2 Column 2 and 6 include continental dummies and variables on foreign ruler, 
biogeographical diversity of countries. Foreign ruler measures how many times in its history a 
country was governed by rulers that originated from other countries. This information comes 
from CAD and HPD datasets.  This variable should mitigate concerns about the effect of 
invasion from religiously different rulers, as well as the effect of ethnic difference between rulers 
and citizens on conflict.  Biogeographical diversity of countries may correlate with conflict and 
the religious difference through its effect on economy, institution and ethnic diversity. Countries 
that are more ethnically diverse may experience more religious difference between rulers and 
citizens. Ethnically diverse groups may be religiously different and compete in capturing the 
state to dominate each other. Also, ethnically diverse places could have been more vulnerable to 
invasion by an outside power. Empirical studies show that geographic factors such as land 
quality, elevation and latitude can determine ethno-linguistic fractionalization (Collard and 
Foley, 2002; Michalopoulos, 2012). The migratory distance from east Africa is also a significant 
predictor for genetic hence ethnic diversity (Ashraf and Galor, 2013a).  Economically different 
places may receive different assignments of the religious differences, as well. Conflict theory 
predicts that the poor fight stronger than the rich because of the opportunity cost they face.
20
 
Thus, one can expect that economically better places may experience religious difference 
between rulers and population more often, holding other things constant. Empirical studies 
                                                     
20
 This is called “paradox of power” in the conflict literature. See (Hirshleifer, 1991).  
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establish that geographic factors that are related to temperature, disease environment and 
suitability for transportation matter for economic development (Sachs and Warner, 2001). The 
literature also argues that countries’ geographic endowments may shape their institutions, which 
affects their economic development (Easterly and Levine, 2003). After controlling for continent 
dummies, foreign ruler and variables on biogeographical diversity, HRDI1 has yet no effect on 
the civil conflict. However, the coefficient of HRDI2 becomes positive and statistically 
significant at 10% level. R-squared value changes from 0.039 in Column 5 to 0.515 in Column 6.  
Column 3 and 7 include historical factors such as transition to agriculture and 
colonialism. Such factors may also correlate with the religious differences and civil conflict 
through its effect on economy, institution and ethnic diversity. Empirical studies show that three 
historical factors may affect ethnic diversity. First, places that have a long human settlement 
history will have more ethnic diversity because they will be subject to more genetic and cultural 
drifts. Second, places that transitioned to agriculture earlier will have more ethnic diversity 
because such places will create state level institution earlier and therefore ethnicity is less needed 
as a device for provision of public goods. Third, colonization may have a homogenizing effect 
on colonial countries ethnic diversity through migration or state formation that is based on 
certain ethnic groups (Ahlerup and Olsson, 2012). These factors may affect economic and 
institutional outcomes, too. The agricultural transition determined by suitable plants and animals 
predicts present day developmental differences across countries (Olsson and Hibbs, 2005). 
Adding these controls does not change the effect of HRDI1, still statistically not significant; but 
it causes a small increase in the coefficient of HRDI2 and makes it statistically significant at a 
5% level. The estimated coefficient of HRDI2 in column 9 suggests that one point increase in 
HRDI2 is associated with an increase of almost 2.5% of number of new civil conflict, a 
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relationship statistically significant at 5% level.   
Columns 4 and 8 add variables on technology use in agriculture, military, transportation 
and communication sectors for the year 0 AC from Comin et al(2010) considering that the level 
of technology use may also affect economic, political and social outcomes which may correlate 
with the religious differences and the civil conflict.  The results are similar. But, the sample size 
goes down from 142 to 127.  
Column 9 includes both HRDI1 and HRDI2 together with the controls on the 
biogeographical factor, the historical factors and continent dummies. Again, the effect of HRDI2 
is statistically significant at 5 % significance level. The coefficient suggest that in its history if a 
country experience one more religious difference between ruler and minority in one of those 15 
intervals, it will experience almost 2.5% increase in new civil conflict today compared to a 
country where there is no religious difference between ruler and population.  
Results from Table 2.2 establish that, rather than HRDI1, HRDI2 has positive and a 
significant effect on civil conflict. This is consistent with the model’s predictions.  
2.4.2  Do the Characteristics of Religions Matter? 
According to the model, the accumulation of grievances also varies depending on the 
value of 𝛿 , which can be affected by the characteristics of religions that the ruler and the 
population have. If the ruler has an official state religion, the segment of the population who does 
not share the same religion with the ruler may resist more in paying their taxes because their 
religion is not favored by the ruler.
21
  𝛿   can also be influenced by the missionary characteristics 
of religions because missionary religions are more absolutist and competitive with each other 
than non-missionary religions.  
                                                     
21
 See Chapter 1 for the definition of state religion. 
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Table 2.3 shows the how historical religious difference between rulers and citizens affect 
the civil conflict when rulers have an official state religion. In Table 2.3 SHRDI1 and SHRDI2 
indicate the historical religious difference between rulers and the majority of population and the 
difference between rulers and the minority of population, respectively while rulers have an 
official state religion. The general pattern in Table 2.2 is repeated here. Bivariate relationships in 
Columns 1 and 3 between SHRDI1, SHRDI2 and the civil conflict are insignificant. However, 
when the continent dummies and other control variables are added as in Columns 2 and 5, the 
coefficient of SHRDI2 becomes significant at 5% level. Although this result is similar to Column 
7 of Table 2.2, the effect size goes up from 0.0243 to 0.0295 because of the likely effect 
through 𝛿 . 
Table 2.3 OLS Estimates of Effect of SHRDI1 and SHRDI2 on PRIO25 Civil Conflict 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES      
      
SHRDI1 0.00625 -0.00168   -0.00220 
 (0.00918) (0.0111)   (0.0104) 
SHRDI2   0.0291 0.0295** 0.0296** 
   (0.0199) (0.0121) (0.0121) 
      
Observations 176 142 176 142 142 
R-squared 0.002 0.587 0.037 0.618 0.618 
Foreign Ruler no yes no yes yes 
Continent Dummy no yes no yes yes 
Geo&Bio Diversity no yes no yes yes 
Historical Factors no yes no yes yes 
Technology no no no no no 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at UN region level are in parentheses. * represents p-values: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. The dependent variable is logarithm of count of new civil conflicts in period 1960-2011, obtained from UCDP Armed 
Conflict Data. SHRDI1 is Historical Religious Difference Index calculated when the ruler’s religion is different from the majority 
religion and the ruler has an official state religion. SHRDI2 is Historical Religious Difference Index calculated when the ruler’s 
religion is different from the minority  religion and the ruler has an official state religion. Foreign Ruler measures how many 
times a country in history is ruled by rulers originated from other countries. For the definition and the source of 
other controls see Appendix A. 
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Table 2.4 OLS Estimates of Effect of HRDI1 on PRIO25 Civil Conflict When Missionary Characteristics of Religions Taken into Account 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES           
           
missionaryVSnonmissionary 0.0395* -0.0231*       -0.0232* -0.0188 
 (0.0199) (0.0122)       (0.0125) (0.0111) 
missionaryVSmissionary   -0.00336 0.0101     0.0118 0.0122 
   (0.00917) (0.0153)     (0.0160) (0.0157) 
nonmissionaryVSnonmissionary       -0.0505*** -0.0499 -0.0323 -0.0264 
       (0.0156) (0.0319) (0.0244) (0.0182) 
nonmissionaryVSmissionary     -0.0438*** 0.0368   0.0449 0.0117 
     (0.0142) (0.0230)   (0.0289) (0.0308) 
HRDI2          0.0215* 
          (0.0107) 
           
Observations 176 142 176 142 176 142 176 142 142 142 
R-squared 0.079 0.601 0.001 0.590 0.010 0.591 0.010 0.591 0.613 0.631 
Foreign Ruler no yes no yes no yes no yes yes yes 
Continent Dummy no yes no yes no yes no yes yes yes 
Geo&Bio Diversity no yes no yes no yes no yes yes yes 
Historical Factors no yes no yes no yes no yes yes yes 
Technology no no no no no no no no no no 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at UN region level are in parentheses. * represents p-values: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable is logarithm of count 
of new civil conflicts in period 1960-2011, obtained from UCDP Armed Conflict Data. missionaryVSnonmissionary is Historical Religious Difference Index calculated when the 
ruler’s religion is different from the majority religion and the ruler has missionary but the majority has non-missionary religion. missionaryVSmissionary is Historical Religious 
Difference Index calculated when the ruler’s religion is different from the majority religion and both the ruler and the majority have missionary. nonmissionaryVSnonmissionary is 
Historical Religious Difference Index calculated when the ruler’s religion is different from the majority religion and both the ruler and the majority have non-missionary. 
nonmissionaryVSmissionary is Historical Religious Difference Index calculated when the ruler’s religion is different from the majority religion and the ruler has non-missionary but 
the majority has missionary religion. HRDI2 is Historical Religious Difference Index calculated when the ruler’s religion is different from the minority  religion. Foreign Ruler 
measures how many times a country in history is ruled by rulers originated from other countries. For the definition and the source of other controls see the 
Appendix A.
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Table 2.5 OLS Estimates of Effect of HRDI2 on PRIO25 Civil Conflict When Missionary Characteristics of Religions Taken into Account 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES          
          
missionaryVSnonmissionary 0.0483** 0.0376*       0.0391* 
 (0.0178) (0.0214)       (0.0211) 
missionaryVSmissionary   -0.00343 0.00818     0.0123 
   (0.0207) (0.0174)     (0.0159) 
nonmissionaryVSmissionary     0.0430*** 0.0154   0.0189 
     (0.0149) (0.0128)   (0.0113) 
nonmissionaryVSmissionary       -0.0481*** 0.0153 0.0103 
       (0.00739) (0.0176) (0.0191) 
          
Observations 176 142 176 142 176 142 176 142 142 
R-squared 0.072 0.619 0.000 0.588 0.018 0.589 0.011 0.587 0.625 
Foreign Ruler no yes no yes no yes no yes yes 
Continent Dummy no yes no yes no yes no yes yes 
Geo&Bio Diversity no yes no yes no yes no yes yes 
Historical Factors no yes no yes no yes no yes yes 
Technology no no no no no no no no no 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at UN region level are in parentheses. * represents p-values: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable is logarithm of count 
of new civil conflicts in period 1960-2011, obtained from UCDP Armed Conflict Data. missionaryVSnonmissionary is Historical Religious Difference Index calculated when the 
ruler’s religion is different from the majority religion and the ruler has missionary but the minority has non-missionary religion. missionaryVSmissionary is Historical Religious 
Difference Index calculated when the ruler’s religion is different from the majority religion and both the ruler and the minority have missionary. nonmissionaryVSnonmissionary is 
Historical Religious Difference Index calculated when the ruler’s religion is different from the minority religion and both the ruler and the majority have non-missionary. 
nonmissionaryVSmissionary is Historical Religious Difference Index calculated when the ruler’s religion is different from the minority religion and the ruler has non-missionary but 
the majority has missionary religion. Foreign Ruler measures how many times a country in history is ruled by rulers originated from other countries. For the 
definition and the source of other controls see Appendix A.
66 
 
Table 2.4 shows the effect of the historical religious difference between the ruler and the 
majority of population (HRDI1) on the civil conflict when the missionary characteristics of the 
religions of the parties are taken into account. In Columns 1 and 2 when the ruler’s religion is 
missionary but the majority’s religion is non- missionary, HRDI1 has a positive and significant 
effect on the civil conflict in bivariate regressions, but adding the control variables changes its 
sign to negative, and it is still significant  at 10% level.  In column 3 and 4 when the religion of 
both the ruler and the majority is missionary, HRDI1 has no effect on the civil conflict. In 
Columns 5 and 6 when the ruler’ religion is non-missionary but the religion of the majority is 
missionary, HRDI1 negative and significant effect on the civil conflict. But, this effect 
disappears when the control variables are included as in Columns 6. In Columns 7 and 8 when 
the religion of both the ruler and the majority is non-missionary, HRDI1 has a negative and 
significant effect on the civil conflict.  
However, this effect disappears when the controls are added to the regression as in 
Columns 8. In column 9 all the above indices are included into the regression with the control 
variables; the effect of HRDI1 still survive and significant at 10% level when the ruler has 
missionary but the majority has non-missionary religion. This negative effect might result from 
that the ruler’s missionary religion homogenizes the population through conversion over time. 
Column 10 shows evidence of this because the conversion happens over time and most probably 
the former majority religion gradually becomes minority and then disappears gradually. If there 
is such a channel, the effect of HRDI1 should diminish when we add HRDI2 into the regression. 
The results in Column 10 support this expectation because adding HRDI2 to the regression 
makes this negative effect disappear while the effect of HRDI2 is still positive and significant.  
I repeat the same exercise for HRDI2.Table 2.5 shows the effects of the historical 
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religious difference between rulers and minority (HRDI2) on the civil conflict when the 
missionary characteristics of the religions of the parties are taken into account. HRDI2 has 
positive and significant effect on the civil conflict in Column 1 and 2 in Table 2.5 when the 
ruler’s religion is missionary but the majority’s religion is non- missionary, similar to the results 
in Table 2.4. 
The results in this section show that when state religion is taken into account in the 
calculation of the indices, (S)HRDI1 is yet not a significant predictor for the civil conflict, but 
(S)HRDI2 is with a higher coefficient. This is consistent with the model in a sense that whether 
rulers have official state religions affect accumulation of grievances and likelihood of conflict 
through 𝛿 . However, when missionary characteristics of religions taken into account in the 
calculation of the  indices, HRDI1 becomes negative and significant predictor of the civil 
conflict if the religion of rulers is missionary, but that of majority is non-missionary. But, this 
effect disappears when HRDI2 (calculated without any categorization of religions in terms of 
being missionary or not) is added into regression, suggesting a religious conversion over time. 
On the other hand, HRDI2 which is calculated when the religion of rulers is missionary but that 
of minority is non-missionary has a positive and significant effect on conflict. These results are 
also consistent with the model’s predictions and suggest that missionary characteristics may 
work through 𝛿  as well as   because of religious conversion.  
2.4.3 Robustness 
Robustness to different values for the weight parameter, . Previously, when 
calculating the indices I set  equal to 1 since the deep root literature has not provided yet a 
theoretical guideline about what value   should take. The natural tendency one may have is to 
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regard it as a time discount factor, and set its value to it accordingly.
 22
 Following this intuition I 
choose                   . Previosly, I divided the period between 1000 and 1950 into 15 
intervals. For these intervals I calculate weight as follows. Let    be    , then for the year 1000,  
 =         , for the year 1100,  =         and so on.23 
Table 2.6 shows the effects of HRDI2 and SHRDI2 when different values are assigned to 
  in the calculation of these indices. The effect of HRDI2 disappears when   is equal to .80 and 
lower. But, the effect of SHRDI2 survives even if    is equal to .65  
Robustness to elimination of countries UN regions. Now, I demonstrate if the results 
that I have shown are driven by influential observations in a certain region of the world. To do 
this, I drop countries based on United Nations’ regions from the sample and estimate the 
coefficient of HRDI2 conditioning on continent dummies, foreign ruler, the biogeographical 
diversity and the historical factors as in Table 2.2 column 7. Results from this exercise are shown 
in Figure 3.  When region 5, East African countries, is dropped, the 95% interval for the estimate 
becomes narrower. However, when region 15, South-central Asian countries, is excluded, the 
estimate becomes less precise, widening the 95% confidence interval. 
Robustness to a different measure of conflict. In the conflict literature regression results are 
usually sensitive to alternative measures of conflict. Now, instead of PRIO25, I use PRIO1000 
coding in UCDP Armed conflict dataset as a dependent variable. PRIO1000 includes only 
conflicts that resulted in  at least 1000 battle related deaths per year.  
                                                     
22
 Choosing a weight lower than one might be irrelevant in deep root context. If there is any deep root story   
should be some function of variables affecting persistence or non-persistence of cultural or institutional traits. 
Maybe, places that interact frequently with outside world should get less weight compared to isolated places, or 
maybe the characteristics of religions and quality of institutions influence persistence/non-persistence, hence  the 
weight parameter most. For such examples see Voigtländer and Hans-Joachim (2012), (Alesina and Fuchs-
Schundeln, 2007)). 
23
 Similar to (Bockstette et al., 2002). 
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Table 2.6 Robustness to changing the weight parameter ω in the calculation of HRDI2 and SHRDI2 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES           
           
HRDI2(omega=.50) 0.0531          
 (0.0931)          
HRDI2(omega=.65)  0.0647         
  (0.0555)         
HRDI2(omega=.80)   0.0534        
   (0.0319)        
HRDI2(omega=.95)    0.0320**       
    (0.0152)       
HRDI2(omega=1)     0.0243**      
     (0.0109)      
SHRDI2(omega=.50)      0.354     
      (0.257)     
SHRDI2(omega=.65)       0.212*    
       (0.121)    
SHRDI2(omega=.80)        0.103*   
        (0.0492)   
SHRDI2(omega=.95)         0.0420**  
         (0.0178)  
SHRDI2(omega=1)          0.0295** 
          (0.0121) 
           
Observations 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 
R-squared 0.588 0.592 0.600 0.612 0.616 0.598 0.604 0.609 0.616 0.618 
Foreign Ruler yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Continent Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Geo&Bio Diversity yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Historical Factors yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Technology no no no no no no no no no no 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at UN region level are in parentheses. * represents p-values: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable is logarithm of count 
of new civil conflicts in period 1960-2011, obtained from UCDP Armed Conflict Data. HRDI2 is Historical Religious Difference Index calculated when the ruler’s religion is 
different from the minority  religion. SHRDI2 is Historical Religious Difference Index calculated when the ruler’s religion is different from the minority  religion as well as ruler 
has official state religion Foreign Ruler measures how many times a country in history is ruled by rulers originated from other countries. For the definition and the 
source of other controls see Appendix A. 
 
 
70 
 
 
Figure 3 Robustness to Elimination of Countries Based on UN Regions 
 
Note: UN regions are: 1. Antarctica, 2.Australia/New Zealand, 3.Caribbean, 4.Central America, 5.East Africa, 6.East Asia, 7.Eastern Europe, 8.Melanesia, 9.Micronesia, 
10.Middle Africa, 11.Northern Africa, 12.Northern America, 13.Northern Europe,14.Polynesia, 15.South-central Asia, 16.South-eastern Asia, 17.South America, 18.Southern 
Africa, 19.Southern Europe, 20.Istern Africa, 21.Istern Asia, 22.Eestern Europe 
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Table 2.7 Robustness to a Different Measure of Civil Conflict - PRIO1000 Civil Conflict 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES          
          
HRDI1 0.0113 -0.00193 -0.00495 -0.00359     -0.00326 
 (0.00843) (0.00958) (0.00989) (0.0107)     (0.00795) 
HRDI2     0.0223* 0.0232* 0.0249* 0.0251* 0.0247* 
     (0.0112) (0.0119) (0.0121) (0.0124) (0.0119) 
          
Observations 176 147 142 127 176 147 142 127 142 
R-squared 0.022 0.369 0.422 0.485 0.065 0.426 0.484 0.544 0.485 
Foreign Ruler no yes yes yes no yes yes yes yes 
Continent Dummy no yes yes yes no yes yes yes yes 
Geo&Bio Diversity no yes yes yes no yes yes yes yes 
Historical Factors no no yes yes no no yes yes yes 
Technology no no no yes no no no yes no 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at UN region level are in parentheses. * represents p-values: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable is logarithm of count 
of new civil conflicts in period 1960-2011, obtained from UCDP Armed Conflict Data. HRDI1 is Historical Religious Difference Index calculated when the ruler’s religion is 
different from the majority religion. HRDI2 is Historical Religious Difference Index calculated when the ruler’s religion is different from the minority  religion. Foreign Ruler 
measures how many times a country in history is ruled by rulers originated from other countries. For the definition and the source of other controls see the 
Appendix A. 
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Table 2.7 presents results where the dependent variable is the number of new PRIO1000 
civil conflict during the period 1960-2011. These results are largely similar to the results from 
Table 2.2 where the dependent variable was the number of new PRIO25 civil conflict for the 
same period. In Table 2.7 HRDI1 is not a significant predictor of PRIO1000 civil conflict. 
However, HRDI2 has a positive and significant effect on the civil conflict even in bivariate 
regressions as in Column 5.   
2.4.4 Evidence on Mediating Channels 
So far I have not included typical determinants of civil conflict that the literature uses in 
analyzing civil conflict such as GDP, current population and current polity characteristics 
because these variables themselves could be dependent variables explained by HRDI2. However, 
including these variable leads to bias in estimates.
 24
  Despite that, I include these variables into 
regression to assess whether the effect of HRDI2 are working through these variables. If 
inclusion of these variables leads to a decline in the coefficient of HRDI2 in the regressions, and 
a substantial increase in R-squared value, this would suggest that these determinants are the 
channels through which HRDI2 is affecting the civil conflict.
 25
 I include them one at a time and 
all together. For time variant variables such as GDP and democracy, I take the period (1960-
2011) average. 
 Table 2.8 shows the result from this exercise. Including these variables one at a time 
does not change the coefficient much, but when I include them all together as in Column 12 the 
coefficient of HRDI2 becomes statistically insignificant.
                                                     
24
 This is known as the bad control problem. For more detail see Angrist and Pischke, (2008, p. 64) 
25
 For a similar exercise see Maccini and Yang (2009) 
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Table 2.8 HRDI2 and PRIO25 Civil Conflict- Mediating Channels 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES             
             
HRDI2 0.0236** 0.0257* 0.0283* 0.0235** 0.0251** 0.0229* 0.0233* 0.0222* 0.0205* 0.0244** 0.0241** 0.0162 
 (0.0110) (0.0144) (0.0147) (0.0111) (0.0107) (0.0110) (0.0114) (0.0112) (0.0115) (0.0112) (0.0109) (0.00999) 
             
Observations 137 103 103 137 137 137 137 137 136 137 137 136 
R-squared 0.571 0.703 0.707 0.572 0.582 0.578 0.572 0.583 0.585 0.579 0.573 0.597 
Continent Dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes no 
Foreign Ruler yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes no 
Geo&Bio Diversity yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Historical Factors yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Autocracy           yes yes 
Democracy          yes  yes 
Executive 
Constraint 
        yes   yes 
Average GDP per 
Capita 
       yes    yes 
Average Oil 
Production 
      yes     yes 
Average Population      yes      yes 
Ethnic 
Fractionalization 
    yes       yes 
Ethnic 
Fractionalization 
   yes        yes 
Religious 
Polarization 
  yes         no 
Ethnic Polarization  yes          no 
             
             
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at UN region level are in parentheses. * represents p-values: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable is logarithm of count 
of new civil conflicts in period 1960-2011, obtained from UCDP Armed Conflict Data. HRDI2 is Historical Religious Difference Index calculated when the ruler’s religion is 
different from the minority  religion. Foreign Ruler measures how many times a country in history is ruled by rulers originated from other countries. These well-
known determinants of civil conflict come from (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Wimmer et al., 2009). For the definition and the source of other controls see Appendix 
A. 
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2.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter analyzes the link between the civil conflict and the historical religious 
difference between ruler and the segments of population theoretically and empirically. I develop 
a political economy model in which the ruler’s choice of public good and the access to it in a 
religiously segmented economy is linked to conflict through grievances. In the model the 
accumulation of grievances varies depending on population of different religious groups as well 
as their compliance in the tax collection process. The model predicts that the case in which the 
religion of rulers is different from that of minority is more conducive to grievances and conflict 
than the case in which the religious difference is between rulers and the majority if rulers care 
more about their staying in power and enjoying their future revenue.  
To test the implications of the model, I use cross-country data on civil conflict as well as 
data on geographical and historical characteristics of each country. In addition, I use a new 
dataset that contains information on the religious and political histories of each country since the 
year 1000. Using this dataset I construct the historical religious difference indices in the light of 
the model to serve as proxy for accumulated grievances.  
Empirical specifications using the variation in these indices establish that the frequency 
of new civil conflict in the post-1960 period was significantly higher in societies that have 
historically had minority religions that differed from the religions of the rulers and that the effect 
depended on the characteristics of religions. 
In future studies, the empirical associations found here should be challenged by studies 
with clear identification strategies to find causal effects. Also, the theoretical model formulated 
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here can be extended by allowing religious conversion over time, productivity differences across 
religious groups, and endogenous choice of religion by the ruler. 
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Appendix A 
A.1 Derivation of Proposition 1 
i. To show that the change in   has an ambiguous effect on the equilibrium value of 
  , it is enough to show the following. Remember that    and    are not a function of  . 
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By the implicit differentiation of equation (25). First, note that in the text we showed that the 
denominator in (A1) is positive due to monotone hazard rate and the legitimacy assumption 
of 𝛿  𝛿 . The effect of change in   on   is ambiguous. To see this 
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To derive (A3), first take derivative of   with respect to  , and then replace  (     ) with its 
expression in (24)) 
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By the implicit differentiation of equation (25) 
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A.2 Appendix Tables 
Table 2A.1 Religions in Historical Polities Dataset 
Category Religion 
Characteristics religion_code 
Traditional/Indigenous Traditional Africa I 40 
  Western Hemisphere indigenous religion I 50 
  N. American indigenous religion I 51 
  Caribbean indigenous religion I 52 
  Meso American indigenous religion I 53 
  S. American indigenous religion I 54 
  Mesoamerican (Aztec and Mayan) I 61 
  Native Andean I 62 
  Pre-Christian European I 70 
  Aboriginal Oceania Religion I 230 
Eastern Native/Local Asian religion I 20 
  hindu E 130 
  jainism E 140 
  sikh E 150 
  buddhist M 160 
  chinese_folk_religion E 171 
  confucian E 172 
  taoism (daoism) E 173 
  Japan (Shinto) E 110 
  Tengrism I 220 
  Shamanism I 240 
Abrahamic jewish E 190 
  christian_catholic M 201 
  christian_orthodox M 202 
  christian_protestant M 203 
  Christianity (Anglican) M 205 
  Christianity (other) M 209 
  islam_shia M 211 
  islam_sunni M 212 
  Islam_Karijite M 213 
None Secular/Non-religion M 300 
Note: E: Ethnic religion, I: Indigenous religion, M: Missionary religion 
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Table 2A. 2 Descriptive Statistics 
     
VARIABLES mean sd min max 
     
Average new civil conflict for the period 1960-2011 0.251 0.643 0 4 
Ruler vs. Majority     
HRDI1 4.193 4.486 0 15 
SHRDI1 2.316 3.564 0 13 
missionaryVSnonmissionary 1.594 3.444 0 15 
missionaryVSmissionary 2.208 3.308 0 13 
nonmissionaryVSnonmissionary 0.179 0.927 0 9 
nonmissionaryVSmissionary 0.184 1.118 0 10 
Ruler vs. Minority     
HRDI2 2.665 3.828 0 15 
SHRDI2 1.344 3.045 0 15 
missionaryVSnonmissionary 0.882 2.552 0 15 
missionaryVSmissionary 1.373 2.432 0 11 
nonmissionaryVSnonmissionary 0.118 0.993 0 10 
nonmissionaryVSmissionary 0.274 1.448 0 15 
Geo&Bio Diversity     
Migratory distance from East Africa 9.591 7.319 0 26.77 
Total land area 634,088 1.769e+06 1.950 1.638e+07 
Absolute latitude 25.78 17.20 1 72 
Percentage of arable land 14.78 13.67 0.0400 62.10 
Mean land quality 0.371 0.248 0 0.960 
Mean elevation 0.505 0.472 0.00100 2.674 
Dispersion in elevation 0.370 0.347 0 1.921 
Roughness of terrain 0.208 0.189 0.00350 1.242 
Temperature 18.67 8.668 -19.45 28.64 
Precipitation 94.78 66.70 2.911 379.3 
Distance to nearest waterway 0.338 0.466 0.00795 2.386 
Variation in land quality 0.199 0.0898 0.000753 0.396 
Dispersion in elevation 1.745 1.399 0.0434 6.176 
Disease richness 208.5 13.07 186 248 
Island nation dummy 0.0470 0.212 0 1 
Landlocked dummy 0.245 0.432 0 1 
Historical Factors     
Population at year 1000 1.818e+06 7.850e+06 2 6.600e+07 
Settlement duration 6.245 4.835 0.120 16 
Duration as colony 1.188 1.844 0 11.45 
Years since Neolithic Revolution (Ancestry adjusted) 5,514 2,102 1,357 10,400 
Technology Use at year 0 AD     
Agriculture 0.951 0.217 1.49e-08 1 
Communications 0.469 0.501 1.49e-08 1 
Transportations 0.556 0.440 1.49e-08 1 
Military 0.810 0.394 1.49e-08 1 
Industry 0.923 0.200 1.49e-08 1 
Foreign Ruler 13 4.113 3 16 
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Table 2A. 3 Estimates of Effect of HRDI1 and HRDI2 on PRIO25 Civil Conflict-Poisson Regression 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES        
        
HRDI1 0.0738 -0.0963 -0.0736    -0.0563 
 (0.0476) (0.0594) (0.0607)    (0.0658) 
HRDI2    0.124*** 0.148** 0.125 0.116 
    (0.0430) (0.0660) (0.0771) (0.0873) 
        
Observations 176 147 142 176 147 142 142 
Foreign Ruler no yes yes no yes yes yes 
Continent Dummy no yes yes no yes yes yes 
Geo&Bio Diversity no yes yes no yes yes yes 
Historical Factors no no yes no no yes yes 
Technology no no no no no no yes 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at UN region level are in parentheses. * represents p-values: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. The dependent variable is count of new civil conflicts in period 1960-2011, obtained from UCDP Armed Conflict Data. 
HRDI1 is Historical Religious Difference Index calculated when the ruler’s religion is different from the majority religion. 
HRDI2 is Historical Religious Difference Index calculated when the ruler’s religion is different from the minority  religion. 
Foreign Ruler measures how many times a country in history is ruled by rulers originated from other countries. For 
the definition and the source of other controls see Appendix A. 
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A.3 Definitions of Variables and their Sources 
Dependent Variable 
Count of New Civil Conflict: number of new civil conflict according to PRIO25 and PRIO1000 codings 
of UCDP armed conflict dataset between year 1960 and 2011. These come from Gleditsch et al.,2002; 
Harbom and Wallensteen, 2012. 
 
Independent Variables 
HRDI: generic form of  historical religious difference index between rulers and population is as follows:  
     = ∑ 
        
  
   
 
where  =                                            ,    indexes country, and     is a binary 
variable equal to 1 if the ruler has religion different from that of citizens in country   at interval  .   is a 
weight parameter, and it is initially set equal to 1. We calculated various form of this index as follows 
HRDI1: Historical religious difference index that shows historical religious difference between rulers and 
the majority. 
HRDI2: Historical religious difference index that shows historical religious difference between rulers and 
the minority. 
SHRDI1: Historical religious difference index that shows historical religious difference between rulers 
and the majority when rulers have official state religion. 
SHRDI2: Historical religious difference index that shows historical religious difference between rulers 
and the minority when rulers have official state religion. 
 
missionaryVSnonmissionary is Historical religious difference index calculated when the ruler has 
missionary but the majority/minority has non-missionary religion 
 missionaryVSmissionary is Historical religious difference index calculated when the ruler has 
missionary and  the majority/minority has missionary religion 
nonmissionaryVSnonmissionary is Historical religious difference index calculated when the ruler has 
non-missionary and the majority/minority has non-missionary religion 
nonmissionaryVSmissionary is Historical Religious Difference Index calculated when the ruler has non-
missionary but the majority/minority has missionary religion 
Foreign Ruler measures how many times a country in history is ruled by rulers originated from other 
countries.  
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Geographic and Bio Diversity and Historical Factors 
Variables related biogeographical diversity and historical factors were taken from (Ashraf and Galor, 
2013a, 2013b) and are openly available at https://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.103.1.1 . 
and https://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.103.3.528. For more detailed explanations of 
these variables see (Ashraf and Galor, 2013b). 
Migratory distance from East Africa: The great circle distance from Addis Ababa, Ethiopia to a 
country’s modern capital city ((Ashraf and Galor, 2013b).  
Total land area: The total land area of a country, in millions of square kilometers, as reported for the 
year 2000 by the World Bank’s World Development Indicators online. 
Absolute latitude: The absolute value of the latitude of a country’s geodesic centroid, as reported on the 
Gothos website. 
Percentage of arable land: The fraction of a country’s total land area that is arable, as reported 
for the year 2000 by the World Bank’s World Development Indicators online. 
Mean land quality: A geospatial index of the suitability of land for agriculture (Michalopoulos, 2012; 
Ramankutty et al., 2002) 
Mean elevation: The average elevation of a country, in thousands of kilometers above sea level (New et 
al., 2002; Nordhaus, 2006). 
Variation in elevation: The standard deviation of elevation within a country’s national borders (New et 
al., 2002; Nordhaus, 2006). 
Roughness of terrain: The degree of terrain roughness of a country (New et al., 2002; Nordhaus, 2006) 
Temperature: The average monthly temperature of a country, in units of ten degrees Celsius per month, 
over the 1961.1990 time period (New et al., 2002; Nordhaus, 2006). 
Precipitation The average monthly precipitation of a country, in units of ten millimeters per month, over 
the 1961.1990 time period(New et al., 2002; Nordhaus, 2006). 
Distance to nearest waterway: The distance, in thousands of kilometers, from a geospatial grid cell to 
the nearest ice-free coastline or sea-navigable river, averaged across the grid cells that are located within a 
country’s national borders(Gallup et al., 1999).  
Variation in land quality: The standard deviation of the agricultural suitability index (as discussed 
above) across the grid cells (at a half-degree resolution) that are located within a country’s national 
borders (Michalopoulos, 2012; Ramankutty et al., 2002). 
Dispersion in elevation: The difference between the maximum and minimum values of elevation 
 across the grid cells (at a 1-degree resolution) that are located within a country’s national borders (New et 
al., 2002; Nordhaus, 2006). 
Island nation dummy: An indicator for whether or not a country shares a land border with any 
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other country, as reported by the CIA.s World Factbook online 
Landlocked dummy: An indicator for whether or not a country is landlocked, as reported by the CIA’s 
World Factbook online.  
 
Historical Factors 
Population at year 1000; Population density at year 1000 AD: Population density (in persons per 
square km) for a given year is calculated as population in that year, as reported by McEvedy and Jones 
(1978), divided by total land area, as reported by the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
((Ashraf and Galor, 2013b). 
Settlement duration: The maximum duration, in tens of thousands of years, of uninterrupted settlement 
by anatomically modern humans across locations within a country’s modern national borders (Ahlerup 
and Olsson, 2012) 
Duration as colony: Duration as colony. The duration, in centuries, of experience by a country (or any 
sub-region thereof) as a colony of one or more colonial powers, including the United Kingdom, France, 
Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, Germany, and the United States(Ashraf and Galor, 
2013a) 
Years since Neolithic Revolution (Ancestry adjusted): The number of thousand years elapsed (as of the 
year 2000) since the majority of the population residing within a country’s modern national borders began 
practicing sedentary agriculture as the primary mode of subsistence. This measure, reported by 
(Putterman, 2008; Putterman and Weil, 2010) 
 
Technology Use 
Technology use data come from (Comin et al., 2010). For more detail on these variables see (Comin et 
al., 2010). This data is openly available at https://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/mac.2.3.65 
Agriculture: average technology adoption in agriculture (a2) in period at 0 AD 
Communication: average technology adoption in communications (c2) in period 0 AD 
Transportation: average technology adoption in transportation (t2) in period 0 AD 
Military: average technology adoption in military (mt2) in period 0 AD 
Industry: average technology adoption in industry (mw2) in period 0 AD
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3. CHAPTER 3: RELIGIOUS ROOTS OF CURRENT 
STATE CAPACITY AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT ACROSS COUNTRIES 
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3.1 Introduction 
Although there is a growing consensus among scholars on the importance of the state capacity 
for economic development, the question of why political rulers should have incentive to invest 
such capacity has not been fully explored yet.  According to Tilly (1985), one of the pioneers of 
the field, the state capacity has evolved over centuries in response to external wars. Wars made 
rulers to invest institutions that help them increase their tax revenue to finance those wars. 
Religion may also play role in emergence or non-emergence of such capacity. Recently, Alesina 
et al(2003) in a cross-country empirical analysis show that religious diversity is positively 
associated with public good provisions and the quality of government, which are the certain 
aspects of the state capacity. They explain this finding by the fact that the developed countries 
have higher religious freedom, hence higher religious diversity. Endogeneity is apparent in this 
explanation. This also raises the question of whether the religious segmentation of population 
provides any incentive or disincentive for political rulers to make any investment on the state 
capacity that are crucial for economic development. Moreover, in the long-term perspective can 
we argue that the state capacity has evolved over time as a result of political rulers’ response to 
religious segmentation of population?  
A body of literature in political science argues that the state capacity is crucial for 
economic development. Migdal (1988, p. 33) says “In parts of the Third World, the inability of 
state leaders to achieve predominance in large areas of their countries has been striking...”.  Evan 
(1995) attributes economic success of East Asian countries to their state capacity. Similarly, 
Herbst ((Herbst, 2000) attributes economic failure of African countries to their lack of state 
capacity.  These types of arguments have been supported by empirical studies (Acemoglu et al., 
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2015; Gennaioli and Rainer, 2007; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013).  
In this chapter I will argue that the religious segmentation of population affects the rulers’ 
choice of state capacity and that such capacity is essential for economic development. I will 
empirically examine the validity of these augments using a historical dataset. I conceptualize 
state capacity as the presence of legal capacity, bureaucratic and administrative capacity, and 
infrastructural capacity.26 This reflects the one aspect of Mann’s conceptualization of 
“infrastructural power” of state (Mann, 1986; Soifer, 2008). Extending the political economy 
model developed in Chapter 2, I explore in detail the ruler’s choice of   , which is the capacity 
that shapes the private production and total output in the economy, and interpret it as the state 
capacity conceptualized here, and examine the way such capacity is affected by the historical 
religious differences between the political rulers and segments of population. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, the ruler may favor co-religionist group in his choice because of the higher tax 
revenue he may expect to receive from co-religionists through the higher tax compliance due to 
the greater legitimacy that shared religion may provide. This differential treatment creates 
grievances among disfavored group and may create conflict at some point as the accumulation of 
historical grievances motivate the disfavored group to fight against the ruler if the cost of 
fighting is reasonably low. Depending on the replacement threat the ruler may be encouraged or 
discouraged to invest in the state capacity (  ). Ruler’s decision and replacement threat will be 
the function of the characteristics of religions and the size of religious groups in the economy. 
To examine the model’s implication empirically, I use the Historical Religious Difference 
Index (HRDI) constructed from the Historical Polities Data (HPD) and Country Ancestry Data 
(CAD) as in Chapter 2. HRDI captures the historical religious differences between the rulers and 
                                                     
26
 For a discussion about the measurements of state capacity, see (Savoia and Sen, 2012) 
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the population since the year 1000 and serves as a proxy for accumulated grievances, hence the 
probability of replacement. I also use data on the state capacity and economic development from 
Quality of Government Dataset, which contains variables on the quality of government 
institutions as well as the well-being of people such as the quality of infrastructure, corruption, 
the effectiveness of bureaucracy, schooling, GDP per capita and so on.  Empirical findings 
establish that countries that have historically had majority religions that differed from the 
religions of the rulers have significantly lower state capacity measured as legal capacity, 
bureaucratic and administrative capacity, and infrastructural capacity. The findings also shows 
that countries that have experienced more religious difference between the rulers and the 
majority have lower GDP per capita, literacy rate and primary school attainment, and higher 
infant mortality rate. 
My approach is related to the literature that regards state capacity as tax or fiscal capacity 
and examines  how such capacity has evolved over time in response to external wars (Besley and 
Persson, 2010; Dincecco, 2009; Gennaioli and Voth, 2015; Tilly et al., 1985). Although my 
approach considers tax capacity as exogenous and dependent on religious legitimacy, it overlaps 
with this literature through the fact that fiscal capacity also requires the capacity that makes the 
economy more productive through such things as laws, ports, and roads. Such complementarity 
between fiscal capacity and the productive capacity is pointed out by Besley and Persson (2010). 
Further, in this literature Besley and Persson (2010) suggest that state-capacity will be deterred if 
each group who competes for controlling the state’s power perceives that the capacity that they 
created will be used against them in the future. Differently, in this chapter, I argue that state 
capacity will be deterred when the ruler’s religion differs from the citizens’. A Self-interested 
ruler may discriminate against religiously different group by switching the availability of public 
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good to the co-religionist group to extract more revenue due to the higher legitimacy working 
through citizens’ tax compliance. This in return may motivate the disfavored group to replace the 
ruler, which puts the ruler’s return from investing in the state capacity into risk, hence deters him 
to make such investment. 
  My approach is also related to standard macro view of government’s role in economic 
growth through productive investment in infrastructures(Barro, 1990; Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 
1992). However this literature does not endogenize the ruler’s incentive to make such 
investments. I contribute this literature by tying the ruler’s investment choice of infrastructure to 
religious difference between the ruler and the population. 
My approach is also related to literature on public good provision in ethnically and 
religiously diverse societies. Some researchers have found that ethnic heterogeneity has a 
negative effect of on public goods provision and poor government performance (Alesina et al., 
2003, 1999; Easterly and Levine, 1997; Porta et al., 1999). The mechanism identified by the 
literature is that the provision of public good in a diverse society will be low in quality because 
the groups in a diverse society will differ in preferences and face a collective action problem in 
the provision of public goods.27 One may incline to expand this argument to religious diversity, 
as well. However, Alesina et al(2003) show, in cross-country regressions, that religious diversity 
has a positive association with the quality of public goods and government, which are the 
elements of the state capacity conceptualized here.  To explain this correlation, they argue that 
developed countries have more religious freedom and hence diversity. I contribute to this 
literature by focusing on a different mechanism to explain the way religion affects the quality of 
public goods and government. Through an argument centered on the legitimizing relationship 
                                                     
27
 For more elaborate discussion on the mechanism see (Habyarimana et al., 2007) 
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between ruler and religion, I reason that when rulers’ religion is different from the segments of 
population, the rulers may have less incentive to invest in productive capacity of the economy 
since they may be replaced by religiously different group in the future.  
My approach is also related to the literature on the political economy of growth and 
development that focuses on the role of distribution of political power in developmental process. 
Government may become predatory, failing to create policies that promote economic growth and 
development-friendly institutions, because such policies change the distribution of political 
power in such a way that the current ruler may not be able to receive the benefit of his efforts for 
development. This can happen because of the commitment problem in political settings 
(Acemoglu, 2005; Acemoglu et al., 2005, 2002, 2001; Evans, 1995; La Porta, 1998; Robinson, 
1998, 1999; Rodrik, 1996). In contrast, I focus on the legitimizing relationship between rulers 
and religion and emphasize a different channel that may cause the political rulers to fail to invest 
in the productive capacity of the economy that promotes economic growth and development. In 
other words, the state may become predatory depending on the religious distribution of society 
where religion has role in legitimizing political rulers. 
My emphasis on the historical origins of state capacity is consistent with the recent 
literature on the deep historical roots of economic growth and development.28  In this literature, 
scholars have shifted emphasis from the proximate determinants of current outcomes to more 
fundamental factors deeply rooted in long-term history (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Bockstette et al., 
2002; Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997; La Porta et al., 1997). I contribute this literature by 
providing an index that shows historical religious difference between political rulers and 
population for each country of today. 
                                                     
28
 For a review of this literature, see Spolaore and Wacziarg (2013) and Nunn (2014) 
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3.2  Model 
This part is the continuation of the model presented in Chapter 2 and intends to analyze the how 
religious differences between the ruler and the population determine the level of the state 
capacity created by the ruler, and specify testable predictions for an empirical analysis.  
In the model in Chapter 2,    represents the level of capacity chosen by the ruler which is 
essential for private production and total output in the economy. In this section, I interpret    as 
the state capacity, and focus on how the choice of it is affected by the religious segmentation of 
population ( ). Comparative static results around steady state value of    presented in 
Proposition 2, which is an extension of Proposition 1 presented in Chapter 2.  
               
i. 
      
  
         
 
A change in the population of type   citizens ( ) has an ambiguous effect on      . To see 
this, let’s look at equation (21) in Chapter 2, which is given as         
([   (     )]   𝛽 [  𝑆 +        ])
       
 , where  𝑆 =     𝛿    =         
𝛿  . Holding other things constant,    
   is increasing in  . However, as   changes   changes, 
as well. In equation (21), the expression in the first square bracket is a decreasing function of   
due to probability of replacement, and the expression in the second square bracket is an 
increasing function of   due to the legitimacy effect (𝛿  𝛿 ). So, the total effect of change in   
on       is ambiguous.  
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Empirical Implications. The propositions derived from the model specify certain predictions on 
the effects of key variables on the level of the state capacity, which can be tested empirically. 
Depending on religious segments of the population ( ) the ruler may invest or disinvest in the state 
capacity. Let’s look at the model’s predictions under the scenarios on how the ruler’s religion differs from 
those of the population, whether it is different from the majority or the minority of population. The 
choice of   will be lower in places where the ruler’s religion is different from that of the 
majority compared to places where the ruler’s religion is different from the minority because in 
the former case the probability of that ruler is staying in the power will be lower. If the ruler 
realizes that he will not enjoy the fruit of his choice of   he created, he will not invest in it as 
much.  
The model speaks about the level of economic output, too. I argued in the theoretical part in 
Chapter 2 that the capacity created by the ruler     shapes the level of economic output    . If 
changes in the parameters of the model help the creation of the state capacity, economic 
development will also be enhanced by these changes, for the countries that have the higher state 
capacity will have the higher level of economic development in the model by construction. 
3.3 Data  
 
Dependent variables. How one should quantify the variable    in the model that indicates the 
capacity created by the ruler that affects the level of private production and the total output in the 
economy? With reference to the theoretical framework three dimensions of the state capacity are 
the most relevant for my analysis: legal capacity, bureaucratic and administrative capacity, and 
infrastructural capacity. Dependent variables that I use to capture such aspects of the state 
capacity come from the cross-country version of Quality of Government Dataset, which contains 
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variables on the quality of government institutions as well as the well-being of people from 
various sources, and is compiled and maintained by the Quality of Government Institute (Teorell 
et al., 2015). This cross-country dataset includes data around 2010 for time varying variables. 
Bureaucratic and administrative capacity in general refers to competence and ability of 
state’s bureaucracy. I quantify this aspect of the state capacity by using the indices of control of 
corruption and government effectiveness from World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(WGI), ICRG indicator of quality of government, Transparency International’s corruption 
perception index, indices on proficiency and impartiality of public administration from Quality 
of Governance Expert-Survey, and an index measuring the ease of doing business in a country 
from World Bank’s World Development indicators (WDI). 
Legal capacity dimension of the state capacity in general refers to the independency of 
judiciary, and the capacity that enforces contracts and protects property rights. As measures of 
such capacity I use the indices of independence of judiciary, rule of law, quality of legal 
institutions, and the indices of property rights from various sources. 
Infrastructural capacity refers to the capacity that reflects the territorial reach of the state. 
To quantify this aspect of the state capacity I use data on road density (km of road per 100 sq. 
km of land area), telephone lines, quality of electricity supply, mobile telephone subscriptions, 
quality of air transport infrastructure, quality of port infrastructure, quality of railroad 
infrastructure, quality of roads, and quality of overall infrastructure. 
 To test the model’s implication on economic development empirically, I use cross 
country data on real GDP per capita, infant mortality, literacy rate, and primary school 
attainment among adults as measures of contemporary economic development. 
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The definition of dependent variables used in this study and their original sources can be 
found in Table 3B.3 in Appendix B. 
Independent variables. The main variables of interest are the indices of the historical 
religious differences between the ruler and the population. These indices are explained in detail 
in Chapter 2. I use the same sets of controls as in Chapter 2 such as variables on the historical 
factors, the biological and geographical diversity, and continent fixed effects. I also use cross-
country data on the other determinants of state capacity discussed in the literature. These are 
variables on legal origin, ethnic fractionalization, democracy, military expenditure, and the value 
of oil export.
29
 
Table 3B.1 in the Appendix B shows the summary statistics of these variables, and Table 
3B.2 shows the correlation between various dependent variables. As seen in the table these 
variables are highly correlated with each other. This might be due to the complementarity among 
the measures of the state capacity, and the measures of economic development. 
3.4  Empirical Framework 
In order to examine the effect of the historical religious differences between the ruler and 
the population on the state capacity and the economic development today, I specify the following 
cross country regression equation: 
  = 𝛽 + 𝛽       +       + 𝑋 
  + +𝑢  
where   is various measures of the state capacity and the economic development as 
described above for country  .         is the index that measures the historical religious 
                                                     
29
 Definition of variables on on the historical factors, and the biological and geographical diversity can be found in 
Appendix A in chapter 2. The definition of variables on the other determinants of the state capacity is in the in Table 
3B.3 in Appendix B in chapter 3. 
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difference between rulers and the majority for country  .         is the index that measures 
historical religious difference between the ruler and the significant minority for country  . 𝑋 
  is 
the vector of control variables as in Chapter 2. 𝑢  is the country specific error term. I report 
robust standard errors and estimate this model by using OLS estimator. 
3.5 Results 
This part presents empirical findings about the effect of HRDIs on the measures of the 
state capacity and the economic development. First, I present results from empirical analysis on 
how the historical religious difference affects the current state capacity across countries. Then, I 
include well-known determinants of the state capacity discussed in the literature into the 
regression analysis to see how sensitive the effects of HRDIs are to the inclusion of these 
determinants. Finally, I look at the effect of HRDIs on the contemporary economic development, 
and show evidence in favor of the state capacity being a mechanism through which the religious 
differences affect the economic development.  
3.5.1 Historical Religious Differences and Current State Capacity? 
In this chapter the state capacity is conceptualized as the legal capacity, the bureaucratic 
and administrative capacity, and the infrastructural capacity, then measured accordingly. This 
part presents results where such state capacity measures are dependent variables to be explained 
by HRDIs. I sometime use the similar dependent variables from different sources in the 
regression analysis to mitigate concerns about whether the effect of HRDIs, if any, is not 
stemming from the peculiarities of certain measures. When I use different dependent variables 
across regressions, the sample size varies due to the availability of data.  
Legal Capacity. Table 3.1 shows the relationship between various measures of the legal 
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capacity and the historical religious differences. From column 1 to column 4 the dependent 
variables are various indices of property rights from different sources. They measure the degree 
to which a country's laws protect private property rights and the degree to which its government 
enforces those laws.  HRDI1 is significantly and negatively associated with these indices. The 
higher the historical religious difference between the ruler and the majority, the lower the 
protection of private property rights.  In column 5 and 6 the dependent variables are the indices 
of rule of law measuring whether there is established mechanism of dealing with disputes in a 
country. HRDI1 is significantly and negatively associated with these indices, as well. In column 
7 and 8 the dependent variables are the measures of independence of the judiciary from different 
sources. HRDI1’s effects on these variables are also negative and statistically significant. In 
column 9 the dependent variable is a measure of overall quality of legal institution in a country. 
This measure has also negative and significant relationship with HDRI1.  
On the other hand, HRDI2, the index measuring the historical religious difference 
between the ruler and the significant religious minority, has no statistically significant effect on 
any measures of the legal capacity in Table 3.1. These findings are in line with the predictions of 
the economic model.  
Bureaucratic and administrative capacity. Table 3.2 shows the relationship between the 
measures of the bureaucratic and administrative capacity and the indices of historical religious 
differences. In column 1 the dependent variable is the index of government effectiveness from 
WGI. It takes values between 0 and 1 and higher values indicate good governance. HRDI1 is 
significantly and negatively associated with this measure. In column 2 the dependent variable is 
ICRG indicator of quality of government, which is the mean value of the ICRG variables of 
corruption, law and order, and bureaucracy quality indices, and scaled between 0 and 1. Higher 
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values indicate higher quality of government. This measure is also negatively and significantly 
associated with HRDI1. In column 3 the dependent variable is an index of ease of doing business 
from WDI. It takes values between 1 and 189, and 1 being the most business-friendly 
regulations. HRDI1 is positively and significantly associated this variable. That is, countries 
become less business friendly on average as they experience more religious difference between 
the ruler and the majority in their history. In column 4 and 5 the dependent variables are the 
indices of corruption from WGI and Transparency International, respectively. These indices 
capture the one aspect of the bureaucratic quality, which is whether government officials 
exercise public power for private gain. The lower values indicate the higher corruption. So, in 
columns 4 and 5, HRDI1 is significantly associated with high corruption. In column 6 the 
dependent variable is the index of impartial public administration that measures to what extent 
the public administration is professional rather than politicized. In Column 7 the dependent 
variable is the index of professional public administration that measures to what extent 
government institutions exercise their power impartially. HRDI1 is negatively and significantly 
associated with these measures, too. However, HRDI2 is not a statistically significant predictor 
of any of these measures.  These results are consistent with predictions of the model.
Infrastructural capacity. Table 3.3 shows the relationship between the measures of the 
infrastructural capacity and the historical religious differences.  The dependent variables from 
column 1 to column 9 are road density, telephone lines, the quality of electricity supply, mobile 
telephone subscriptions, and the quality of air transport infrastructure, the quality of port 
infrastructure, the quality of railroad infrastructure, the quality of roads, and the quality of 
overall infrastructure, respectively. HRDI1 is negatively and significantly associated with all of 
these measures of the infrastructural capacity. In column 10 the dependent variable is an index 
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Table 3.1 Historical Religious Difference and Legal Capacity 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES hf_prights wef_pr fi_legprop fh_pair fh_rol wbgi_rle wef_ji ciri_injud kun_legabs 
                    
HRDI1 -1.185*** -0.0682*** -0.0965*** -0.126** -0.136* -0.0482*** -0.0996*** -0.0511*** -0.00888*** 
 
(0.378) (0.0168) (0.0244) (0.0559) (0.0733) (0.0156) (0.0221) (0.0151) (0.00293) 
HRDI2 0.222 0.0120 -0.0271 -0.0402 0.0170 0.00108 0.0254 0.00618 0.00123 
 
(0.447) (0.0191) (0.0229) (0.0633) (0.0768) (0.0164) (0.0208) (0.0136) (0.00326) 
          Observations 133 116 120 137 137 137 116 136 137 
R-squared 0.555 0.523 0.687 0.682 0.615 0.623 0.561 0.534 0.612 
Continent FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Bio&geo diversity yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Historical factors yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Dependent variables: hf_prights is Property Right Index from Heritage Foundation.  wef_pr  is Property Right Index from World Economic Forum. fi_legprop is 
Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights from Fraser Institute. fh_pair is Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights from Freedom House. fh_rol is Rule 
of Law Index from Freedom House. wbgi_rle is Rule of Law Index from Worldwide Governance Indicators. wef_ji is Judicial Independence from World 
Economic Forum. ciri_injud is Independence of the Judiciary from the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset. kun_legabs is Absolute legal 
institutional quality from Kuncic (2013). Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.2 Historical Religious Difference and Bureaucratic and Administrative Capacity 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES wbgi_gee icrg_qog wdi_eodb wbgi_cce ti_cpi qs_impar qs_proff 
        HRDI1 -0.0512*** -0.0106*** 1.980** -0.0484*** -0.110*** -0.0534*** -0.0692*** 
 
(0.0159) (0.00338) (0.763) (0.0145) (0.0295) (0.0112) (0.0200) 
HRDI2 -0.00757 -0.000373 0.692 -3.57e-05 0.00143 0.0111 0.00946 
 
(0.0173) (0.00352) (0.928) (0.0149) (0.0323) (0.0147) (0.0227) 
        Observations 137 118 132 137 137 94 94 
R-squared 0.619 0.653 0.628 0.646 0.648 0.664 0.574 
Continent FE Yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Bio&geo diversity Yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Historical factors Yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Dependent variables: wbgi_gee is Government Effectiveness from Worldwide Governance Indicators.  icrg_qog is ICRG indicator of quality of 
government. wdi_eodb is an index of ease of doing business from World Development Indicators. wbgi_cce is Control of Corruption Index from 
Worldwide Governance Indicators. ti_cpi is Corruption Perceptions Index from Transparency International.  qs_impar is Impartial Public 
Administration from the Quality of Governance Expert-Survey. qs_proff is Professional Public Administration from The Quality of Governance 
Expert-Survey. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.3 Historical Religious Difference and Infrastructural Capacity 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES wdi_roaddens wdi_telephone wef_elec wef_mobile wef_qair wef_qport wef_qrail wef_qroad wef_qoi ffp_ps 
           HRDI1 -4.626** -0.580*** -0.0900*** -1.452*** -0.0629*** -0.0720*** -0.102*** -0.124*** -0.0992*** 0.108*** 
 
(1.774) (0.196) (0.0242) (0.496) (0.0222) (0.0210) (0.0250) (0.0258) (0.0212) (0.0282) 
HRDI2 1.070 0.0190 -0.0287 -1.418** 0.0167 0.00267 -0.00189 -0.00828 -0.0209 0.0456 
 
(1.409) (0.274) (0.0287) (0.543) (0.0256) (0.0234) (0.0309) (0.0294) (0.0243) (0.0363) 
           Observations 98 137 116 116 116 116 108 116 116 137 
R-squared 0.593 0.774 0.700 0.680 0.521 0.584 0.636 0.570 0.631 0.776 
Continent FE yes Yes yes yes yes Yes yes Yes yes yes 
Bio&geo diversity yes Yes yes yes yes Yes yes Yes yes yes 
Historical factors yes Yes yes yes yes Yes yes Yes yes yes 
Dependent variables: wdi_roaddens is road density (km of road per 100 sq. km of land area) from World Bank’s World Development Indicators. wdi_telephone 
is telephone lines (per 100 people)  from World Development Indicators . wef_elec is quality of electricity supply from World Economic Forum. wef_mobile is 
mobile telephone subscriptions/100 pop World Economic Forum. wef_qair is quality of air transport infrastructure World Economic Forum. wef_qport is quality 
of port infrastructure World Economic Forum. wef_qrail quality of railroad infrastructure World Economic Forum. wef_qroad is quality of roads World 
Economic Forum. wef_qoi is quality of overall infrastructure World Economic Forum. ffp_ps is  Public Services Index from Found for Peace. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. 
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that measures the provision of public services such as the services of health, education, and 
sanitation. This variable takes values between 0 and 10, and higher values indicate lower 
provisions. HRDI1 has positive and statistically significant effect on this measure of 
infrastructure. That is, as countries experience more religious difference between the ruler and 
the majority in their history, their level of the public service provisions worsens, on average. 
However, HRDI2 is not a statistically significant predictor of any infrastructural capacity 
measures. These results are consistent with the predictions of the economic model. 
The other determinants of state capacity. Next, I introduce the other determinants of the 
state capacity discussed in the literature into the regression analysis. The literature considers 
legal origins, ethnic fractionalization, democracy, the value of oil export, and military 
expenditure as important determinants of the state capacity.30 The purpose of this exercise is to 
see how sensitive the effect of HRDI1 to the inclusion of these variables. I have not incorporated 
these variables in the main analysis because of the bad control problem. Namely these variables 
themselves can be dependent variable explained by HRDIs. If the inclusion of these variables 
changes the effect size of HRDIs, this would suggest that HRDIs affect the measures of the state 
capacity through these variables. Instead of using all the capacity measures discussed so far, I 
use a subset of them that suffice to capture the aspects of the legal capacity, the infrastructural 
capacity, and the bureaucratic and administrative capacity so that results can be presented in one 
table. 
Table 3.4 shows the results. Across all columns the effects of HRDI1 survive, and they 
are still statistically significant. However, after the inclusion of these other determinants of the 
state capacity, the effect sizes go down significantly compared to results in Tables 3.1 - 3.3. This 
                                                     
30
 For example see (Dincecco and Prado, 2012; Savoia and Sen, 2012). For the definition and original sources of 
these variables see Table 3B.3 in Appendix B. 
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Table 3.4 HRDIs and the Other Determinants of State capacity 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES fi_legprop wbgi_rle ciri_injud wbgi_gee icrg_qog ti_cpi qs_impar wef_qoi ffp_ps 
                    
HRDI1 -0.0654*** -0.0227* -0.0305** -0.0260** -0.00618** -0.0566*** -0.0346*** -0.0731*** 0.0662*** 
 (0.0203) (0.0121) (0.0139) (0.0125) (0.00280) (0.0207) (0.0113) (0.0201) (0.0217) 
HRDI2 -0.0284 -0.00637 -0.00711 -0.0161 -0.00225 -0.0207 -0.00283 -0.0360* 0.0607* 
 (0.0257) (0.0152) (0.0120) (0.0163) (0.00342) (0.0268) (0.0120) (0.0186) (0.0330) 
Democracy 0.0331 0.0836*** 0.0754** 0.0777*** 0.00479 0.146*** 0.00518 0.0301 -0.132** 
 (0.0533) (0.0267) (0.0359) (0.0269) (0.00614) (0.0517) (0.0312) (0.0385) (0.0528) 
Ethnic fractionalization -1.179* -0.453 -0.145 -0.362 -0.0286 -0.493 0.0317 -0.185 0.559 
 (0.597) (0.326) (0.318) (0.311) (0.0687) (0.603) (0.364) (0.424) (0.599) 
Net oil exports value per capita, constant 2000 $ 0.000108** 8.75e-05** -4.23e-06 5.02e-05 1.15e-05 0.000117 -2.71e-06 -3.36e-06 -0.000358*** 
 (5.39e-05) (4.16e-05) (3.76e-05) (3.93e-05) (8.47e-06) (7.47e-05) (4.73e-05) (5.62e-05) (7.76e-05) 
Legal Origin-United Kingdom 0.352 0.214 0.395 -0.132 -0.0148 -0.733 -0.125 0.593 -0.366 
 (0.561) (0.244) (0.308) (0.250) (0.0488) (0.598) (0.350) (0.502) (0.636) 
Legal Origin- France -0.403 0.0568 0.282 -0.234 -0.0666 -1.142* -0.366 0.345 -0.255 
 (0.608) (0.273) (0.331) (0.270) (0.0571) (0.643) (0.401) (0.544) (0.661) 
Legal Origin-Soviet Union -0.779 -0.492* -0.0705 -0.772*** -0.230*** -2.247*** -0.728* -0.189 0.477 
 (0.567) (0.256) (0.329) (0.244) (0.0466) (0.591) (0.380) (0.490) (0.673) 
Legal Origin-Germany 0.522 0.353 0.525 0.254 0.0172 0.174 0.0611 1.263** -2.062** 
 
(0.586) (0.261) (0.349) (0.283) (0.0495) (0.579) (0.361) (0.495) (0.864) 
Military Expenditure -1.54e-08 3.98e-09 2.67e-08** -2.01e-09 2.68e-10 1.97e-09 2.00e-09 3.96e-09 -5.80e-09 
 
(1.62e-08) (1.07e-08) (1.17e-08) (8.58e-09) (2.15e-09) (2.24e-08) (1.12e-08) (1.07e-08) (1.58e-08) 
          Observations 119 136 135 136 118 136 93 115 136 
R-squared 0.783 0.761 0.653 0.759 0.783 0.802 0.752 0.715 0.873 
Continent FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Bio&geo diversity yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Historical factors yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Dependent variables: fi_legprop is Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights from Fraser Institute. wbgi_rle is Rule of Law Index from Worldwide 
Governance Indicators. ciri_injud is Independence of the Judiciary from the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset. wbgi_gee is Government 
Effectiveness from Worldwide Governance Indicators. icrg_qog is ICRG indicator of quality of government . ti_cpi is Corruption Perceptions Index from 
Transparency International. qs_impar is Impartial Public Administration from the Quality of Governance Expert-Survey. wef_qoi is quality of overall 
infrastructure World Economic Forum. Scandinavian legal origin is the base category. See Table 3B.3 in Appendix B for the definition of the other 
variables. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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suggests that a portion of the effect of HRDI1 on the state capacity is working through these 
other determinants. 
The results in this section establish that the historical religious differences between the 
political rulers and the majority of population have negative and significant effect on current 
state capacity. This effect still survive after the other determinants of the state capacity, namely 
legal origins, ethnic fractionalization, democracy, military expenditure, and the value of oil 
export are controlled for in the regressions. 
 
3.5.2 Historical Religious Differences and Contemporary Economic Development? 
So far I have showed that the historical religious differences negatively affect the current 
state capacity. Especially, when the differences were between the ruler and the majority, these 
effects are statistically significant. As I argued before, the state capacity is the pathway to 
economic development. In this part I will first empirically examine whether the historical 
religious differences are affecting current economic development across countries, and then test 
whether such effect, if any, is working through the state capacity channel. In the regression 
analysis I will use GDP per capita, infant mortality rate, literacy rate, and a measure of primary 
school attainment as measures of economic development.  
 Table 3.5 shows the relationship between the measures of development and indices of 
the historical religious differences between the political rulers and the population. In column 1 
the dependent variable is per capita GDP based on purchasing power parity, constant in 2011 
international dollars. HRDI1 is negatively associated with this GDP per capita measure, and this 
relationship is statistically significant at 1% level.  The coefficient of HRDI1 in the table 
suggests that when a country experiences one more religious difference between the ruler and the 
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majority of population in one of those 50 or 100-year-intervals in their history, its per capita 
GDP become lower by 772.7 dollars today. This implies that, if a country experienced religious 
difference between rulers and the majority throughout history, instead of having no religious 
difference between population and the ruler, its per capita GDP would be lower by almost 11,590 
dollars.31 This is a significant number when we consider that the average GDP per capita in the 
sample is around 16,000 dollars. In column 2 the dependent variable is the literacy rate for adult 
female and male. HRDI1 has negative and significant association with this variable. In column 3 
the dependent variable is the infant mortality rate. HRDI1 has positive and significant effect on 
this variable, That is, as countries experience more religious difference between the ruler and the 
majority in their history, their infant mortality rate goes up, on average. In column 4 the 
dependent variable is a measure of primary school attainment. HRDI1 has a negative and 
significant effect on this measure, as well.  
Table 3.5 Historical Religious Difference and Economic Development 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES wdi_gdppcpppcon une_litat une_imr bl_lp_15mf 
          
HRDI1 -772.7*** -0.544** 0.595* -0.606* 
 
(227.6) (0.271) (0.341) (0.342) 
HRDI2 -153.3 -1.334*** 0.428 -0.0997 
 
(250.0) (0.270) (0.370) (0.381) 
     Observations 131 108 136 118 
R-squared 0.667 0.808 0.795 0.519 
Continent FE yes yes yes yes 
Bio&geo diversity yes yes yes yes 
Historical factors yes yes yes yes 
Dependent variables: wdi_gdppcpppcon is per capita GDP based on purchasing power parity, constant in 2011 
international dollars from World Development Indicators. une_litat is literacy rate adult total from UNESCO. 
une_imr is infant mortality rate from UNESCO. bl_lp_15mf is percentage with primary schooling, female and male 
(15+) from Barro and Lee (2013).  Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
                                                     
31
 Remember that I divided each country’s history into 15 periods from year 1000 to 1950  (100-year interval up to 
the year 1500, and  50-year interval thereafter). So, the GDP per capita difference is calculated as 15x772.7=11590.5 
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However, HRDI2 is not a statistically significant predictor of the most of these economic 
outcomes. It has significant and negative effect only on the literacy rate in column 2.  
Mechanism. Table 3.5 has established the negative relationship between the historical 
religious differences (between the rulers and the population) and contemporary economic 
development. Now I empirically examine whether the state capacity, as I argued in the 
theoretical part, is the mechanism leading to economic development. If inclusion of the state 
capacity measures leads to a decline in the coefficient of HRDI1 in the development regressions, 
and a substantial increase in R-squared value, this would suggest that those state capacity 
measures are the channels through which the historical religious differences influence the current 
economic development.  
 
Table 3.6  the dependent variables across all columns are GDP per capita, the main 
economic development measure in the analysis. I include Property Right and Rule of Law 
variables in columns 1 and 2 as measures of the legal capacity, the ICRG Indicator of Quality of 
Government, and Corruption Perception index in columns 3 and 4 as measures of the 
bureaucratic and administrative capacity, and in column 5 Quality of Overall Infrastructure 
variable as a measure of the infrastructural capacity. Inclusion of these variables decreases the 
coefficient of HRDI1 across all columns (compare them with column 1 in Table 3.5). Each of 
these variables has a statistically significant effect on per capita GDP, and increases R-squared 
value significantly in the table. This provides evidence in favor of the state capacity being a 
channel through which the historical religious difference between the ruler and the majority is 
affecting current economic development. 
The results in this section establish that the historical religious differences between the 
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political rulers and the majority have negative and significant effect on current economic 
development, and that the effect of the historical religious differences works through the state 
capacity channel. 
 
Table 3.6 State Capacity as a Mechanism for Economic Development 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES 
GDP per 
capita 
GDP per 
capita 
GDP per 
capita 
GDP per 
capita 
GDP per 
capita 
            
HRDI1 -346.8* -274.5 -261.1 -166.0 -322.7 
 
(181.5) (176.7) (215.4) (180.7) (326.0) 
HRDI2 -250.0 -222.5 -306.4 -247.1* 26.42 
 
(168.1) (176.4) (206.0) (144.9) (208.3) 
Property Rights (hf_prights) 366.5*** 
    
 
(48.68) 
    Rule of Law  (wbgi_rle) 
 
10,186*** 
   
  
(1,138) 
   ICRG Indicator of Quality of Government 
(icrg_qog) 
  
50,735*** 
  
   
(5,820) 
  Corruption Perceptions Index (ti_cpi) 
   
5,565*** 
 
    
(475.5) 
 Quality of Overall Infrastructure (wef_qoi) 
    
5,674*** 
     
(1,374) 
      Observations 128 131 112 131 114 
R-squared 0.787 0.803 0.825 0.824 0.745 
Continent FE yes yes yes yes yes 
Bio&geo diversity yes yes yes yes yes 
Historical factors yes yes yes yes yes 
Dependent variables across all columns are per capita GDP based on purchasing power parity, constant in 2011 
international dollars from World Development Indicators. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
In conclusion, religious histories of today’s nations have lingering effects on their state 
capacity and economic development. This chapter establishes that the historical religious 
differences between the political rulers and the majority of population are strongly associated 
with the state capacity as well as economic development, and that the state capacity is the 
110 
 
pathway to economic development. Countries that have experienced more historical religious 
differences between the political rulers and the majority of the population have lower levels of 
the legal capacity, the bureaucratic and administrative capacity, and the infrastructural capacity. 
These countries also have lower levels of economic development, measured as the GDP per 
capita, the schooling, and the infant mortality rate. These findings hold after controlling for the 
biogeographic variables (e.g. latitude, elevation), the historical factors (e.g. colonialism, 
Neolithic transition to agriculture), and continent fixed effects.  
Explanation for these results suggested by the economic model developed in chapter 2 
and 3 is that a self-interested ruler may discriminate against members of a different religious 
group by favoring the co-religionist group in access to public goods and services in an effort to 
extract more revenue due to the higher legitimacy that works through citizens’ tax compliance 
behavior. However, the disfavored group may rebel against the ruler, which creates replacement 
threat for the ruler, which deters him to invest in the state capacity.  This explanation also 
connects religious legitimacy arguments with productive investment, a missing link in the 
literature.  
The strong association between the religious differences and economic development 
deserves attentions from comparative development literature. Even though this literature 
highlights the importance of institutional and cultural factors for development outcomes, it has 
neglected the significance of religious differences between political rulers and segments of 
population in development process. State and religion are the two oldest institutions in human 
history and their interactions over time must affect wide range of economic outcomes. 
 In future studies, the empirical associations found here should be challenged by analysis 
with clear identification strategies to find causal effects. Also, the theoretical model formulated 
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here can be extended by allowing religious conversion over time, productivity differences across 
religious groups, and endogenous choice of religion by the ruler. 
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Appendix B 
 
Table 3B.1 Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Name 
Variable code as in 
the QoG dataset 
  Mean SD Min Max 
Legal capacity 
     Property Rights hf_prights 43.23 23.57 5 95 
Property rights wef_pr 4.29 1.02 1.79 6.45 
property right fi_legprop 5.58 1.59 2.12 8.85 
Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights fh_pair 9.66 4.03 0 16 
Rule of Law fh_rol 8.46 4.79 0 16 
Rule of Law - Estimate wbgi_rle -0.07 0.99 -2.45 1.98 
Judicial independence wef_ji 3.87 1.3 1.27 6.69 
Independence of the Judiciary ciri_injud 0.9 0.91 0 2 
Absolute legal institutional quality (simple averages) kun_legabs 0.55 0.21 0.08 0.96 
Bureaucratic and administrative capacity 
     Government Effectiveness - Estimate wbgi_gee -0.06 1 -2.24 2.26 
ICRG Indicator of Quality of Government icrg_qog 0.54 0.2 0.08 1 
Ease of doing business index (1=most business-friendly 
regulations) wdi_eodb 95.23 54.19 1 189 
Control of Corruption - Estimate wbgi_cce -0.06 1 -1.74 2.41 
Corruption Perceptions Index ti_cpi 3.99 2.08 1.01 9.3 
Impartial Public Administration qs_impar -0.11 0.71 -1.48 1.51 
Professional Public Administration qs_proff 3.93 0.95 2.06 6.32 
Infrastructural capacity 
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Road density (km of road per 100 sq. km of land area) wdi_roaddens 111.23 373.61 1.03 3850 
Telephone lines (per 100 people) wdi_telephone 19.23 18.97 0.02 116.46 
Quality of electricity supply wef_elec 4.5 1.58 1.18 6.8 
Mobile telephone subscriptions/100 pop. wef_mobile 102.74 37.07 14.46 203.88 
Quality of air transport infrastructure wef_qair 4.59 1.1 2.2 6.81 
Quality of port infrastructure wef_qport 4.24 1.1 1.5 6.77 
Quality of railroad infrastructure wef_qrail 3.07 1.41 1.03 6.78 
Quality of roads wef_qroad 4 1.26 1.52 6.48 
Quality of overall infrastructure wef_qoi 4.3 1.14 1.89 6.64 
Public Services ffp_ps 5.83 2.37 1.1 9.7 
Economic development 
     GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2011 international $) wdi_gdppcpppcon 16098.11 18629.36 416.17 1.31E+05 
Literacy Rate, Adult, Total une_litat 82.81 18.51 25.31 100 
Infant mortality rate une_imr 28.61 28.01 1.7 120.9 
Percentage with Primary Schooling, Female and Male (15+) bl_lp_15mf 27.12 15.85 2.44 70.43 
Other determinates of state capacity 
     Democracy democ 3.72 3.65 0 10 
Ethnic fractionalization al_ethnic 0.44 0.26 0 0.93 
Net oil exports value per capita, constant 2000 $ ross_oil_netexpc 403.01 2152.57 -5133.54 14410.85 
Legal origin - English legor_uk 0.34 0.47 0 1 
Legal origin - French legor_fr 0.44 0.5 0 1 
Legal origin -Soviet legor_so 0.17 0.38 0 1 
Legal origin - German legor_ge 0.03 0.17 0 1 
Legal origin - Scandinavian legor_sc 0.02 0.16 0 1 
For summary statistics of variables on biogeographic diversity, historical factors and continent fixed effects see Table 2A.1 in Appendix A in Chapter 2.
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Table 3B.2 Correlation between Dependent Variables (n=91) 
 
fi_legprop wbgi_rle ciri_injud wbgi_gee icrg_qog ti_cpi qs_impar wef_qoi ffp_ps wdi_gdppcpppcon.. une_imr 
            fi_legprop 1 
          wbgi_rle 0.9287 1 
         ciri_injud 0.7173 0.8272 1 
        wbgi_gee 0.9022 0.9673 0.8004 1 
       icrg_qog 0.9047 0.9362 0.7592 0.9377 1 
      ti_cpi 0.9036 0.9456 0.8159 0.9405 0.9245 1 
     qs_impar 0.7978 0.8578 0.7964 0.855 0.8238 0.8751 1 
    wef_qoi 0.8303 0.8206 0.6724 0.8564 0.8217 0.8136 0.6923 1 
   ffp_ps -0.8367 -0.8819 -0.7295 -0.8862 -0.8226 -0.8576 -0.7467 -0.8122 1 
  wdi_gdppcpppcon 0.8199 0.8319 0.6462 0.8466 0.8274 0.841 0.6923 0.8063 -0.8787 1 
 une_imr -0.5739 -0.6279 -0.5233 -0.6755 -0.5611 -0.5906 -0.4958 -0.6189 0.7878 -0.6678 1 
 
Note: fi_legprop: Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights (current) from Fraiser Institute,   wbgi_rle: Rule of law index from WGI,  
ciri_injud: an index of Independence of the Judiciary, wbgi_gee: Government Effectiveness from WGI, icrg_qog: Quality of government,  
qs_impar: Impartial Public Administration, wef_qoi: Quality of overall infrastructure, ffp_ps: Public Services, wdi_gdppcpppcon: GDP per capita  
PPP (constant 2011 international $) from WDI, une_imr: Infant mortality rate from UNESCO. 
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Table 3B.3 Definition of Variables 
Variable code as in Quality of 
Government data 
Variable name Definition 
Legal Capacity 
ciri_injud Independence of the 
Judiciary 
Independence of judiciary from other branches of government or military. 0 indicates not 
independent, 1 indicates partially independent, 2 indicates generally independent. From 
Cingranelli and Richards(2010) 
fh_pair Personal Autonomy 
and Individual Rights 
It measures state’s controls over people’s economic choices such as residence, family size, and 
employment; evaluates the right of citizens to own property and establish private businesses. It 
takes values between 0 (worst) and 16 (best). From Freedom House. Available at 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-aggregate-and-subcategory-scores 
fh_rol  Rule of Law The variable measures the independence of the judiciary; rule of law exists in civil and criminal 
matters; equal treatments from  law and police for segments of the population; the protection 
from political terror. It takes values between 0 (worst) and 16 (best). From Freedom House. 
Available at https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-aggregate-and-subcategory-scores 
fi_legprop Legal Structure and 
Security of Property 
Rights (current)  
The variable measures trust in legal framework, protection of property rights, independence 
from military It ranges from 0(worst) to 10(best). From Fraser Institute, Gwartney et. al (2010). 
hf_prights  Property Rights  It measures whether private property rights are protected by law and law is enforced by 
government. It also measures the chance that private property will be expropriated, and the 
presence of corruption within the judiciary. It ranges from 0 and 100, where 100 represents the 
maximum degree of protection of property rights. From Heritage Foundation, 2014. Available 
at http://www.heritage.org/index/explore 
kun_legabs  Absolute legal Absolute legal institutional quality (simple averages). From Kuncic (2013). 
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institutional quality 
(simple averages)  
wbgi_rle  Rule of Law – 
Estimate 
It includes perceptions of the incidence of crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the 
judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts. From World Bank’s Worldwide Governance 
Indicators, Kaufmann et al.(2010). 
wef_ji  Judicial 
independence 
To what extent is the judiciary in your country independent from influences of members of 
government, citizens, or firms? [1 = heavily influenced; 7 = entirely independent]. From W. E. 
Forum, “The global competitiveness report 2012-2013,”  2012. 
wef_pr  Property rights  How would you rate the protection of property rights, including financial assets, in your 
country? [1 = very weak; 7 = very strong]. From W. E. Forum, “The global competitiveness 
report 2012-2013,”  2012. 
Bureaucratic and Administrative Capacity 
icrg_qog   ICRG indicator of 
quality of government 
The mean value of the ICRG variables Corruption, Law and Order, and Bureaucracy Quality, 
scaled  0-1. Higher values indicate higher quality of government. From International Country 
Risk Guide. 
ti_cpi  Corruption 
Perceptions Index 
It measures corruption in the public sector, whether the abuse of public office for private gain as 
perceived by business people, risk analysts and the general public. It takes values between 10 
(highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). From Transparency International, Treisman (2007). 
wbgi_cce  Control of 
Corruption - Estimate  
This variable measures perceptions of corruption, conventionally defined as the exercise of 
public power for private gain. From World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators, 
Kaufmann et al.(2010). 
wbgi_gee  Government 
Effectiveness - 
Estimate  
It consists of the quality of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the 
competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil service from political pressures, and 
the credibility of the government's commitment to policies. From World Bank’s Worldwide 
Governance Indicators, Kaufmann et al.(2010). 
qs_impar Impartial Public 
Administration 
The index measures to what extent government institutions exercise their power impartially. 
The impartiality norm is defined as: When implementing laws and policies, government 
officials shall not take into consideration anything about the citizen/case that is not beforehand 
stipulated in the policy or the law. From Quality of Government Expert Survey, Teorell et 
al.(2011). 
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 qs_proff Professional Public 
Administration 
The index measures to what extent the public administration is professional rather than 
politicized. Higher values indicate a more professionalized public administration. From Quality 
of Government Expert Survey, Teorell et al.(2011). 
wdi_eodb Ease of doing 
business index 
(1=most business-
friendly regulations) 
Ease of doing business ranks economies from 1 to 189, with first place being the best. A high 
ranking (a low numerical rank) means that the regulatory environment is conducive to business 
operation. From W. B. Group, World Development Indicators 2012. 
Infrastructural Capacity 
ffp_ps   Public Services It includes pressures and measures related to policing, criminality, education provision, literacy, 
water and sanitation, infrastructure, quality healthcare, telephony, internet access, energy 
reliability, roads. It ranges between 0 (good) and 10 (bad). From Found for Peace, available at 
http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/ 
wdi_roaddens  Road density (km of 
road per 100 sq. km 
of land area) 
Road density is the ratio of the length of the country's total road network to the country's land 
area. The road network includes all roads in the country: motorways, highways, main or 
national roads, secondary or regional roads, and other urban and rural roads. W. B. Group, 
World Development Indicators 2012 
wdi_telephone  Telephone lines (per 
100 people) 
Telephone lines are fixed telephone lines that connect a subscriber's terminal equipment to the 
public switched telephone network and that have a port on a telephone exchange. W. B. Group, 
World Development Indicators 2012 
wef_elec  Quality of electricity 
supply  
How would you assess the quality of the electricity supply in your country (lack of interruptions 
and lack of voltage fluctuations)? (1 = insufficient and suffers frequent interruptions; 7 = 
sufficient and reliable). From W. E. Forum, “The global competitiveness report 2012-2013,”  
2012. 
wef_mobile  Mobile telephone 
subscriptions/100 pop  
Number of mobile telephone subscriptions per 100 population. From W. E. Forum, “The global 
competitiveness report 2012-2013,”  2012. 
wef_qair  Quality of air 
transport 
infrastructure  
How would you assess passenger air transport infrastructure in your country? (1 = extremely 
underdeveloped; 7 = extensive and efficient by international standards). From W. E. Forum, 
“The global competitiveness report 2012-2013,”  2012. 
wef_qoi  Quality of overall 
infrastructure  
How would you assess general infrastructure (e.g., transport, telephony, and energy) in your 
country? (1 = extremely underdeveloped; 7 = extensive and efficient by international standards). 
From W. E. Forum, “The global competitiveness report 2012-2013,”  2012. 
wef_qport  Quality of port 
infrastructure  
How would you assess the port facilities in your country? (1 = extremely underdeveloped; 7 = 
well developed and efficient by international standards). For landlocked countries, the question 
is as follows: How accessible are port facilities? (1 = extremely inaccessible; 7 = extremely 
accessible). From W. E. Forum, “The global competitiveness report 2012-2013,”  2012. 
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wef_qrail  Quality of railroad 
infrastructure  
How would you assess the railroad system in your country? (1 = extremely underdeveloped; 7 = 
extensive and efficient by international standards). From W. E. Forum, “The global 
competitiveness report 2012-2013,”  2012. 
wef_qroad  Quality of roads  How would you assess the road system in your country? (1 = extremely underdeveloped; 7 = 
extensive and efficient by international standards). From W. E. Forum, “The global 
competitiveness report 2012-2013,”  2012. 
Economic Development 
wdi_gdppcpppcon GDP per capita  PPP 
(constant 2011 
international $) 
GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP). Data are in constant 2011 international 
dollars. From W. B. Group, World Development Indicators 2012. 
une_litat Literacy Rate Adult 
Total 
Percentage of persons aged 15 and over who can read and write. From UNESCO available at 
http://www.uis.unesco.org/Datacentre/Pages/instructions.aspx?SPSLanguage=EN 
une_imr Infant Mortality rate Probability of dying between birth and exactly one year of age expressed per 1,000 live births. 
From UNESCO available at 
http://www.uis.unesco.org/Datacentre/Pages/instructions.aspx?SPSLanguage=EN 
bl_lp_15mf Percentage population 
with Primary 
Schooling 
Percentage of primary schooling in male and female population aged 15 and over. From Barro 
and Lee (2013). 
Other Determinants of the State Capacity 
al_ethnic Ethnic 
fractionalization 
It measures the probability of that two-randomly drawn people in a country belong different 
ethnic groups. From Alesina et al.(2003).  
ross_oil_netexpc Oil export Net oil exports value per capita, constant 2000 $. From Ross(2013). 
lp_legor Legal Origin The legal origin of the Company Law or Commercial code of each country: 
English Common Law, French Commercial Code, Socialist/Communist Laws, German 
Commercial Code, Scandinavian Commercial Code. From La Porta et al.(1999) 
 Democracy It measures the extent of institutionalized democracy, averaged for the period 1960-2000. From 
Polity IV data set. 
 Military expenditure Total military budget for a given country and year, averaged over the period 1800-2001. From 
National Material Capabilities Dataset version 4.0, Singer et al.(1972). 
 
Note: Democracy variable was taken from Ashraf and Galor(2013), Military Expenditure was taken from National Material Capabilities Dataset 
version 4.0, Singer et al.(1972), and the other variables in the table were taken from the Quality of Government Dataset 2014 version.  
 
